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PREFACE 
The present thesis is concerned primarily with the 
words Seneca uses to specifly his Supreme Being. With this pur-
pose in view it was n~cessary to use at very frequent intervals, 
especially in Chapter Four, quotations from Seneca's works. To 
retain the Latin feeling and shades of mefu'1.L"g contained in the 
Latin wording Seneca's direct words were inserted as much as 
possible. This was done even within the course of an English 
sentence when it was felt the Latin flavor would be lost in the 
transfer to the English. Also, since Seneca's works were used 
very freely, abbreviations of the various titles were used in 
the many footnotes. To assist the reader who might not be well 
acquainted with Seneca's works we h.ereby insert a key to the 
essays and letters employed in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CASE PRESENTED 
The life and -writings of Lucj_us Annaeus Seneca have 
interested, puzzled, and intrigued mankind all during his life 
and ever since ~is death. There certainly was no philosopher 
of his period who could equal him in seriousness of thought and 
no statesman who had run the gamut of success and failure in 
public office and imperial favor more completely than he. 
As a philosopher Seneca launched out into no unplumbed 
depths of metaphysics or ethics. His was the desire to utilize 
principles already recognized and to instil in men a love of 
philosophy and the wisdom for which it taught men to strive. 
For him Philosophy was simply an attempt to reach wisdom,l 
which he called the Sumnru.m Bonum of the human mind. And the 
Summum Bonum viewed practically for him was quod honestum ~.2 
This thought recurs again and again as the theme around which 
all his letters and philosophical essays are centered. It must 
be admitted that it was a theme well worthy of any man's pen. 
And to say that Seneca ably fulfilled the task he set for him-
self would be to belabor the obvious. 
1 
2 
Richard Gummere, ed. and transl., Seneca: E~istulae 
Morales, London, William Heinemann, 1934, 8 .4 . · 
Ep. Mor. 71.4 
2 
However, as Tacitus was to remark some years later, in 
those days of the Empire it was better to be without ability 
than to come to the attention of the ruler. And Seneca was one 
who by the grace of his talents and the entangling web of cir-
cumstances only too often and forcibly came under the scheming 
eye of a Caligula or a Nero. It is not our intention to vin-
dicate Seneca's character as Tacitus appears to do or to drop 
sly hints of adultery or usury as Dio Cassius3 and Juvenal4 in-
tend. Seneca's life may have stood in open contradiction to 
his elevated doctrine. Still, J. Wight Duff for one, while 
giving us a rather exhaustive list of Seneca's supposed weak-
nesses and improprieties, seems to think that he is innocent. 
The story of improper relations with Julia so obviously served 
Messalina's machinations that it cannot be accepted as incon-
trovertible fact, while the suggestion of an amour with Agrip-
pina is even more incredible. That Seneca was privy to deaths 
of Claudius, of Britannicus and of Agrippina was whispered and 
repeated, but the ru~ours can be neither proved or disproved. 
His weak condonation of such deeds very naturally subjects him 
to suspicion. That he advocated the contempt of wealth and yet 
accumulated it, is not to be gainsaid; even so, and granted 
that he lent money on interest, we are not bound to believe 
Dio's statement that Seneca caused an insurrection in Britain 
by suddenly calling in the huge sum of forty million sesterces.5 
However, all these things, even though they were true, would 
not lessen the importance or value of his thoughts and teach-
ings. For the "power of Seneca as a moral teacher has, with 
some reservations, been recognized by all the ages since his 
3 Edward Cary, ed. and transl., Dio Cassius: Roman History, 
London, William Heinemann, 192~61.10 
4 Charles Anthon, ed., The Satires of Juvenal and Persius, 
New York, Harper Bros:;-1879, 8.2~ ---
5 J. Wight Duff, A Literart History of Rome in the Silver Age, 
New York, Chas.-Scribner s Sons, 1~5~4-----
3 
time.n6 And "Seneca, like Tacitus, has a remarkable power of 
moral diagnosis."? It is Seneca the teacher of moral doctrine 
that we seek. It matters not whether this belief coincides 
with his deeds. Besides, many Christians under more favorable 
circumstances and with far greater graces have failed to main-
tain the standard of life that they by their very name profess 
to follow. 
One historian abstracts for a moment from the actual 
content of Seneca's doctrine and the conduct of his life just 
to consider r1im as the completest specimen of the professed 
philosopher of antiquity. 
He was neither a statesman who indulged in moral speculation, 
like Cicero, nor a private citizen who detached himself, like 
Epicurus or Zeno, from the ordinary duties of life, to devote 
himself to the pursuit of abst~act truth. To teach and preach 
philosophy in writing, in talking, in his daily life and con-
versation, was, indeed, the main object he professed; but he 
regarded all public careers as practical developments of moral 
science, and plumed himself on showing that thought may in 
every case be combined with action.8 
Seneca, therefore, as this man well states, aims "to teach and 
preach philosophy." Throughout the course of his essays and 
letters he does not let himself or his reader forget the end he 
has in mind. This is one point in which Seneca does maintain 
the greatest coherency and consistency. It mattered not 
whether he spoke De Providentia or Ad Helviam de Consolatione. 
6 Samuel Dill, Roman Society From Nero to Marcus Aurelius, 
London, Macmillan and Co. , 'mL>, ...,-- -
7 Dill, 9 
8 Charles Merivale, History of the Romans under the Empire, 
New York, Longmans Green ana TIC:, 1904, 8.269 
4 
The general aim of the essay and the tenor of the doctrine re-
mained the same. His "secundum naturam vi vere" and "ad illius 
legem exemplumque formari sapientia est"9 sum up his entire 
philosophy. And to this one idea he has held firm in each 
succeeding essay. 
Philosophy for Seneca was not an organized division of 
investigation into cosmology, logic, and other philosophical 
branches. His philosophy was only ethics, the study of mor-
ality, quod honestum ~· But yet, Seneca went far above the 
level of honestum and turpe to ascend to the height of per-
fection and asceticism. It might sound strange to speak of an 
ancient and pagan ascetic, but some have labelled Seneca just 
that. "Whatever may be thought of his excellencies. or defects 
as a writer, or of the caricature and priggishness of the Stoic 
sect, he was in his writings an earnest, a highly pretending, 
and apparently a sincere advocate of ascetic severity.ttlO And 
in this special field of philosophy, in which he preordained 
himself to labor under the aegis of Zeno, Seneca "was the prin-
cipal ornament of Stoicism in his day, and a valuable instructor 
of mankind." 11 
Mention has been made on several occasions, sometimes 
9 John W. Basore, ed. and transl., Seneca: Moral Essays ,LON-
DON, William Heinemann, 1928, De Vita Beata 3.2 
10 Benjamin H. Malkin, Classical Dis~itions, London, Long-
man, Hurst, Rees, Orme, Brown,· an Green, 1825, 295 
11 Malkin, 296 
~·· 
5 
directly, sometimes implicitly, that Seneca followed the Stoic 
doctrines. Stoicism, it is surely plain, was the general "sys-
tem'~ followed by Seneca, but whether he was consistent with this 
plan as proposed by Zeno, and advanced by Cleanthes and Chry-
sippus in his concept of a Supreme Being, is just the point 
under discussion in this thesis. It is well known that many 
writers, judging superficially from Seneca's general aim of 
~lfo<.fh:..:CX. and the supremacy of Reason over Fate, which are de-
cidedly Stoic proposals, wish to classify him immediately and 
in all things as a Stoic. Others, however, seeing such beau-
tiful expressions as "cogitas quanta nobis tribuerit parens 
noster"l2 and "patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum 
et illos fortiter amatttl3 contend that Seneca has deserted the 
camp of Stoicism for the Christian concept of God. 
The solution, however, is not quite this simple. First 
of all, Seneca is not expounding or elaborating a Stoic "system" 
of philosophy. This would be impossible, for the Stoics 
really had no "system" of subjects or doctrines as we know them 
today. Systems were a subjective arrangement of later date. 
Zeno gave lectures and writings on a physical theory of the 
universe. His Greek followers, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, took 
various phases of these doctrines and elaborated them. Cleanthes 
took physics and Chrysippus, because of his many controversies, 
12 De Ben. 1.29.3 
13 De Prov. 2.6 
6 
turned to the study of logic. Seneca, in turn, never proposed 
to classify or analyze the works of these men. His special 
forte was to be ethics. And, since ethics presupposes meta-
physics, he also includes passing phases of this branch of 
philosophy in essays and letters. No Stoic, not even Epictetus 
and Marcus Aurelius at later dates, gave us complete expositions 
of a "system," but only lectures on general topics or jottings 
of random ideas. This lack of system is extremely unfortunate; 
still, says one man "as it was the aim of the Stoics to form 
men and not merely to train reasoners or to produce orators, 
that determined their mode of procedure.ttl4 
Another point that must be considered is Seneca's in-
coherency. George A. Simcox in his History of Latin Literature 
says: "He never succeeds in having a plan in any of his larger 
works; he is at the mercy of the association of ideas and of 
the way in which one topic suggests another.ttl5 This is evi-
dent in the De Beneficiis and the De Ira. After speaking of 
the ingratitude manifested by those who forget past benefits in 
the early part of Book Three of the De Beneficiis Seneca. gets 
the thought that this is an odious vice and so perhaps should 
not go unpunished. This leads him to expatiate on various 
charges brought against cities and on the procedure of a law 
14 
15 
W~lliam L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, Edinburgh, T. Clark, 
1907, 32 ---
George A. Simcox, A Histor~ of Latin Literature, New York, 
Harper and Bros., 1906, 2. 
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court. At the outset of Book Two of the De Ira Seneca says 
that in this early section "quaerimus enim ira utrum judicio an 
impetu incipiat,t•16 but in reality he tells how virtue considers 
anger reprehensible and how unworthy of the wise man it is to 
sink to this level. This same fault also makes for greater con-
fusion in the present discussion, since Seneca nowhere in his 
writings takes time to explain in detail to what he has refer-
ence when, for instance, in the ~ .2!!£ he asks "qui sit deus; 
deses opus suum spectet an tractet.nl7 From this important 
idea, which he views quite contemptuously, as the context shows, 
Seneca then passes on without any further elaboration of what 
might have been a topic sentence. 
A third difficulty has rendered it almost impossible 
for certain scholars to make any decision on such technical 
points as Seneca's concept of God. For, as Cruttwell puts it, 
like all the other thinkers of the time he cared nothing for 
cons~ency of opinion, everything for impressiveness of appli-
cation. He was Stoic, Platonist, Epicurean, as often as it 
suited him to employ their principles to enforce a moral 
lesson.l8 
And, as another author remarks, "Seneca made a sort of amal-
gamation of the moralities of Zeno and Epicurus; it was true 
that one proceeded from idealism and the other from materialism, 
but what did it matter~ttl9 A third states that he "contra-
16 
17 
18 
19 
De Ira 2.1.1 
De Otio 4.2 
Charles T. Cruttwell, A Histor' of Roman Literature, Lon-
don, Chas. Griffin and-Co. IS '7, 38'7 
Albert Grenier, The Roman Spirit, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
926 398 - .. 
dieted himself within the range of the same treatise.tt20 
Probably the most patent example of this fault is Seneca's 
8 
vigorous attack against the Stoical doctrine that the wise man 
will take part in the government of the state. Seneca indicates 
that Zeno, to mention only one, remained a private teacher all 
his life. Therefore, if Zeno was consistent, he had intended 
his teaching of participation in civil life in some other sense, 
or attached some condition to it. But all this, of course, 
Seneca did not even mention until he himself, beginn;ng to fear 
for his life, desired to withdraw from public life. 
Therefore, the lack of system, incoherency, and incon-
sistency in Seneca should prevent one from falling into the 
mistake of certain investigators who believe the problem ex-
tremely simple or just non-existent. For them a certain set of 
quotable expressions sound exactly like St. Paul or, ~ contra, 
similar to the most complete Stoic. Thus, they are easily led 
to believe that this or that was Seneca's idea of God. The 
very same difficulties, however, have kept most men from giving 
any opinion on this subject at all. This is, at least, a safe 
~ 
procedure. One writer, Samuel Dill, as shall be seen in a 
later chapter, declares the god of Seneca possesses a spiritual 
nature in one place and a pantheistic existence on the very 
following page. But he is unique in that. Most men, in re-
20 Duff, 207 
9 
ferring to the god of Seneca hardly go beyond expressing certain 
resemblances to Christian and to Stoic concepts. They have don 
much in carrying their investigations as far as they have and 
"the jungle of literature which has grown up around Seneca tes-
tifies to the manifold inquiries stimulated by his personality 
and works.n21 Still, even though "his influence makes him one 
of the most prominent figures in the history of letters"22 we 
are yet seeking tne clarification of many statements in his 
works. Seneca's idea of God is one of these problems. 
The present study is an attempt to reach a satisfactory 
answer to the question, "'i'lhat did Seneca mean by the many terms 
he used to signify a Supreme Being?" In other words, "What is 
God for Seneca?" 
This question is one exceedingly worthy of research on 
various scores. Seneca has been termed a great teacher, philo-
sopher, and writer. Because of his re_putation'and position it 
is good to see his beliefs on the basis of erudition alone. 
But an even more important reason was Seneca's influence during 
his own lifetime and his reputation throughout the centuries. 
Being a man who was intimately connected with the emperors and 
on the political scene for many years, he very naturally spread 
his ideas to a large number of the ruling class and through 
them to the private citizens. Just how much Seneca's teachings 
21 Duff, 196-7 
22 Duff, 197 
10 
counteracted or assisted the rising Christianity is another 
question, but there can be no doubt that the two doctrines of 
Stoicism and Christianity met one another within the boundaries 
of Rome. St. Paul's Epistle!£~ Romans was sent in approxi-
mately 57 A.D. and t~is fact alone indicates that a goodly 
number of Christians were then abiding in the capital of the 
world. 
Be that as it may, Seneca's position, personal con-
tacts, and writings made him and his utterances of wide impor-
tance both in his day and ours. Tacitus, Dio Cassius, Juvenal, 
Martial all voice different reactions of the ancients while J. 
Wight Duff's comments on the wealth of Senecan commentaries23 
point out the impression Seneca has made upon medieval and 
modern scholars alike. It is obviously worthwhile then to 
consider and weigh the most important concept any man could 
have in the works of t:lis most important man. 
Was Seneca's concept of a Supreme Ruler of the universe 
the conventional pantheism or materialistic principle of the 
preceding Stoics? Or was it an idea that was altered by the 
influence of Christianity into a spiritual, personal, loving 
creator and guardian of men? Or did Seneca so interwine and 
mix his manner of speaking as to indicate that he himself had 
no clear concept of God? 
23 Duff, 197 
11 
It is clear from Seneca's many references to the Epi-
cureans, Pythagoreans, Cynics, and Stoics that his life and 
learning had come under the influence of· these various schools 
of philosophy. To assist in discovering Seneca's owfi concept 
of God it becomes necessary to consider the men from whom he 
imbibed his doctrine and even those whom he claims he rejects 
and anathematizes. It will be easier then to classify him with 
a eertain group or to find in what he disagrees with them. Or 
we can see how he constructs an amalgam of var:i_ous ideas to 
satisfy his purpose of the moment. 
Secondly, it is important to find what deductions 
various selected classical scholars have arrived at after their 
reading of Seneca's own words. As has been expressed earlier, 
these investigations, in most cases, consist merely of a few 
words of explanation for a few select phrases from Seneca. 
But even this is of some worth since it shows very plainly 
either how little research has been done on this topic or how 
difficult men have found its solution to be. If little re-
search has been done, there is no reason why that situation 
should continue. If the solution is difficult, it is useful 
to see why, and, if possible, to provide a suitable answer. I~ 
any case the work will be profitable, for it will clarify the 
extent of the studies already made and show the need of furthei 
evidence and examination before any conclusive statement can 
be issued. 
12 
Seneca's testimony itself, however, is the important 
element. His philosophical essays and letters give many re-
ferences to god, Nature, Fate, and Fortune. In some instances 
these terms will signify t'.1e same thing. At other times not. 
Frequently the language of Seneca equals that of any Christian, 
as when he says: "plurima beneficia nos deus defert sine ape 
recipiendi, quoniam nee ille conlato eget nee nos ei quidquam 
conferre possumus.»24 But apparently he grovels just as low 
in materialism in his statement: "mundua hie, qu.o nihil neque 
majus neque ornatius rerum natura genui t. tt25 How then to 
account for this and many other apparent contradictions? That 
question constitutes the heart of any study on the God of 
Seneca. Before any answer can be offered one must understand 
Seneca's references to god and Fate in their contextual back-
ground, and then as weighed against Seneca's general philo-
sophical "system" and the influence exerted on him. All this 
must urecede the fir1.al decision. 
In each of the following chapters, then, we will de-
termine: (1) What others have said about Seneca's idea 
of God; (2) vVha t influences were exerted upon Seneca;: 
(3) What Seneca himself had to say; 
(4) What we can conclude from the evidence pre-
sented. 
24 De Ben. 4.9.1 
25 Ad Helv. 8.4 
~~----------------~ 
CHAPTER II 
WHAT O~BERS SAY 
In the actual study of Seneca much time and attention 
have been devoted to breaking through the mere shell.of words 
into the heart and mind of the author himself. There are so 
many points which puzzle one who is reading Seneca for the 
first, or thetundredth, time that he is inclined to meditate on 
the actual meaning various passages held for their author. 
Then, after further investigation one must either confess that 
he has found no answer or he will endeavor to list what he be-
lieves is the true interpretation of Seneca's words. For, the~ 
are so many practical applications in Seneca that each one 
thinks himself privileged to give the true meaning concealed in 
his words. 
It is no wonder, therefore, that classical scholars in 
each age find in Seneca something that demands their interest. 
For some it is Seneca's life itself in relation to the politi-
cal movements of the times. Others wish to evaluate his mor-
ality according to the standards of his own doctrines. Many 
are attracted to the peculiarities of his literary style. And 
a host are halted by the more than passing similarity to the 
Christian principles of life. Whatever it is that draws men to 
,..-· 
r-------------------------------------------~~14~--
Seneca, he has become one of the more,widely discussed and de-
bated about authors of the Silver Age. 
All types of analysts are to be found in Senecan lit-
erature. Numerous writers '1ave been drawn to give their opin-
ions of what Seneca's ideas on God really were. The conclus-
ions they reached are many and varied, depending in large part 
on the extent of their study. To a lesser degree their answers 
must hinge on their own cultural, philosophical, and religious 
background, although an investigation of these will scarcely 
enter into the scope of the present topic. It is sufficient to 
note that various answers have been given and conflicting con-
elusions reached by many who have touched on Seneca's concept 
of the Supreme Being of the universe. 
In studying the opinions offered by a dozen or more 
classicists one finds three answers given on the essence of the 
deity. The first position held is one of initial and final 
doubt; the second is the doctrine of Stoicism and materialism; 
the last is that of Christianity and spirituality. 
In his book, The Stoic Creed, William Davidson treats 
the entire Stoic school from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius, with 
greater stress placed on Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aure-
lius. First, he assumes that Seneca maintained all the Stoic 
doctrines, and, secondly, he fails to state which one or what 
) 
group of the other writers held a certain opinion attributed to 
~~------------~ 15 
the Stoics. Nevertheless, in two passages in which special re-
ference is made to Seneca, Davidson admits he can come to no de-
finite decision, for "whether the supreme providence is a living 
personal God, or merely an impersonal principle, the course of 
nature, or the universe itself, is very doubtful."l Further on, 
relying, no doubt, in part on Seneca's own admission that "nemo 
novit deum,"2 he says~ 
Right well, for instance, does Seneca realize that it is not 
possible for us to comprehend fully the power that made all 
things, although we may discover him in part on every hand. On 
two poj_nts alone is he perfectly assured - namely, THAT THERE 
IS A GOD, AND THAT WE ARE rro ASCRIDE TO HIM ALL NlAJESTY AND 
GOODNESS •3 
Faced with the all too many inconsistencies that appear on the 
surface of Seneca's works, Davidson refuses to believe that 
Seneca himself knew the ultima essentia of God. 
Just a step beyond the state of doubt registered by 
Davidson is the certainty of another scholar that one God does 
exist. 
It is of interest to note that Seneca makes his contribution to 
the search for a satisfying monotheism; that he keeps alight 
the torch kindled by Panaetius and tended by Posidonius, Varro, 
and Cicero ••• Indeed, it may be said the most important advance 
in theory made by Roman Stoics is to be found in the gradual 
substitution of one god for the pantheistic materialism of Zeno 
and his earlier Greek followers.~ 
This man calls it an important advance to come to the con-
1 Davidson, 214 
2 Ep. Mor. 31.10 
3 Davidson, 221 
4 Hubert McNeill Poteat, "Some Reflections on Roman Philo-
sophy," Classical Journal, 33.520 
~~------------~ 16 
elusion that one God exists. His statement is true. However, 
the nature of this one God is forgotten. And, in reality, it 
seems difficult to see how one could arrive at the conclusion 
titat there must be one God without understanding something more 
of his nature. 
In his mention of Seneca the Greek scholar, Caird, con-
curs in the generalities already offered. His idea seems to be 
that Seneca did not attempt to reach any ultimate answer, but 
was satisfied to take for granted basic ethical principles and 
the ultimate nature of reality. 
The crude theories of Epicurus and Zeno as to the criterion of 
truth, and as to the ultimate nature of reality, are in a dis-
tinctly lower key of speculation than the Platonic and Aris-
totelian metaphysic and dialectic. Still lower from a scien-
tific, if not from a literary point of view, are the epigram-
matic moralisings of Seneca, the aphoristic meditations of Mar-
cus Aurelius, and practical sermons of Epictetus, in all of 
which the theoretic basis of ethics is rather presupposed than 
explained.5 
Most authors, however, incline in varying degrees 
toward the opinion that Seneca was possessed of Stoical ten-
dencies. Probably the weakest affirmation in that regard, al-
though quite symptomatic, is one that says nothing of the deity 
in Seneca, but lists Seneca's dependence on the Stoic system. 
Although Seneca feels very strongly that philosophy is to be 
practical, and not a mere compendium of abstract truths, he is 
always entangling himself in casuistry, for scruples grow up 
fast when people insist on suppressing the strongest of their 
natural impulses, and the artificial estimate of life on which 
5 Edward Caird, The Evolution of Theolog~ in the Greek Philo-
sophers, Glasgow, James MacLehese and ons,~04, 2.39-40 
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the Stoics laid so much stress as a guide to right conduct re-
quired to be guarded by an immense apparatus of distinctions. 
seneca distrusts his own wealmess too much to be independent; 
though he is always fretting at the bondage of system, he never 
emancipates his favorite conception of bona mens from the para-
doxical trammels of Zeno and Chrysippus:o-- ---- . 
This quotation also indicates the problem experienced by other 
students in determinj_ng any final judgment of Seneca's words 
when it mentions Seneca as "always entangling himself in casuis-
try." 
How much Seneca leans upon Stoic arguments is better 
described by Ralph Stob. He comes to certain conclusions, which, 
though more revealing, are not very detailed. "The primary sub-
stance is the fiery Logos. This resides in God and man. The 
two are identical. Man is God, and God is man. Since the Stoic 
has only an immanent God, it naturally follows that God and man 
are one. The teaching runs all through the Stoic writings.n7 
Just what the nature of God and then of the "fiery Logos"is is 
mentioned later on in the clause, "in view of the God-concept of 
Stoicism which presents God only as immanent and then, too, im-
personal and material. n8 Seneca, therefore, is presumed to be 
a Stoic and to be following the general Stoic concept that God 
is immanent, impersonal, and material. Just what evidence there 
was in Seneca to lead Stob to this opinion is not revealed. 
Another writer also takes for granted that Seneca is a 
6 Simcox, 2.15 
7 Ralph Stob, "Stoicism and Christianity," Classical Journal, 
30.219 
8 Stob, 220 
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stoic, though admitting he does have a different tone to his 
doctrines because he seems to imbibe something of the spirit of 
other schools of philosophy. "He(Seneca) was opposed to the 
doctrines of his school in no important point; nevertheless, 
his phllosophy breathes a somewhat different spirit from that 
of the ancient Stoics. He made use of other authorities than 
the Stoics, especially the works of Epicurus.n9 Despite this 
note of eclecticism "without contradicting the Stoic material-
ism and pantheism he(Seneca) laid special emphasis on the eth-
ical features of the Stoic idea of God on which the belief in 
providence was based.nlO Therefore, according to this author, 
Seneca concurred in the metaphysical concepts of the Stoics 
concerning God, but paid little heed to this field of philo-
sophic exploration. His forte was ethics, hence his love for 
further elaborating the benevolent side of God's nature. There-
fore, we find many references to such attributes as mercy, kind-
ness, generosity, and providence, but few to the essence of the 
deity from whence they flow. 
In a somewhat more elaborate treatment, Chief Ancient 
Philosophies, Stoicism, w.w. Capes seems to be straining to 
find soPe note of Christianity in what he claims to be the Stoi 
al teachings of Seneca. Capes is not even too sure that Seneca 
is nothing more than an eclectic, for in a lengthy passage he 
9 
10 
Eduard Zeller, Outlines of ~ History of Greek Philosophy, 
New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931, 267 
Zeller, Outlines of the History~ Greek Philosophy, 268 
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takes pains to show Seneca's tendency to borrow what pleased him 
from philosophers of any school whatsoever. 
Some of the most striking parallels to our religious thought be-
long, not to Seneca himself or to the system of philosophy which 
he professed but to earlier schools and different thinkers from 
whom he freely borrowed. We have already called attention to 
this tendency, which was natural enough in that late age when 
rigid exclusiveness was out of date and eclecticism had become 
a ruling fashion. Thus the beautiful expressions to be found 
in him about our Heavenly Father, from whom come all good and 
uerfect gifts, whom we should try to imitate, that we may be 
perfect like our Father ••• these and many others may be found in 
Plato centuries before they gained a place, but not always a 
harmonious setting, in the letters and dialogues of Seneca. In 
the school of Pythagoras, which he followed in his youth, he 
may have learnt to examine himself, as was his later practice, 
to listen to the voice of conscience, and to confess the wrong 
which he had done. From Epicurus, as we have seen, he borrowed 
much, and among other sentiments that one, "the consciousness 
of sin is the first step towards salvation,"(Ep. Mor. 28) on 
which so much stress has been laid as an evidence of Scriptural 
doctrine.ll 
Still, for all his borrowing, Seneca was always a Stoic at 
heart, says Capes. "But there can be no doubt that Seneca ad-
hered without hesitation to the Stoic creed, and his reserves 
and compromises belong more to his heart than to his head. 11 12 
This statement is a trifle difficult to understand in view of 
a further admission. "We see, therefore, that in spite of all 
his borrowed phrases of the school, there is little in Seneca's 
own teaching of the hardness and coldness of the Stoical 
school. ttl3 If Capes by this passage means to infer that Sen-
eca's teaching was not Stoical in essence as well as expression, 
then he apparently is not clear in his own mind as to what sys-
11 
12 
13 
William W. Capes, Chief Ancient Philosophies, Stoicism, 
New York, Pett, Young ruLd Co., 1880, l68-9 
Capes, 150 
Capes, 156 
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tem and doctrines Seneca was trying to follow. It is more 
likely, however, that Capes saw more in Seneca than his Chris-
tian manner of speaking, for he says: "Devotional language there 
may be, indeed, to express the fervour of emotion, kindled by 
the effort to pursue in thought the Absolute Being in all its 
endless changes through the immensities of tim~ and space. ttl4 
He wishes to stress the fact that an emotional element flowed 
through Seneca, 
yet we must admit that resemblances of tone and style do not 
touch the essentials of the moral system, and fail to bridge 
over the gulf between the Stoic and the Christian system. The 
former was Pantheistic still; its God is diffused through all 
the stages of creation; its providence is an inexorable fate; 
its Holy Spirit ebbs and flows like tidal waves through all the 
multitudinous realms of Nature.l5 
He continues his discourse on Seneca's Stoicism by indicating 
that the deity is not the persona we might conclude he is from 
his attributes. nThe Fatherhood of God is an unmeaning phrase 
in such a system. Instead of filial devotion to a personal 
will, we have submission to an absolute law.ttl6 In yet another 
place he says: uNo personal Maker had brought man into being; 
there was no one to call him to account for his stewardship 
of powers entrusted to his keeping. Instead of, 'The Lord 
giveth, the Lord hath taken away 1 ••• we read in Seneca, 'Fortune 
has taken away my friend, but he was her gift.' nl7 
14 Capes, 173 
15 Capes, 172 
16 Capes, 173 
17 Capes, 175 
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In all this Capes treats Seneca's writings in general, 
as can be seen from the quotations offered, and briefly mentions 
some reflections of his own. Without explicitly listing pass-
ages in Seneca or giving a fair sampling of quotations, he fa-
vors the opinion that Seneca's deity followed the Stoic concept 
in all essentials, but that Seneca adopted a more devotional 
tone, such as Plato would employ, whenever his purpose demanded 
such a touch. Just what Capes considered the essentials of 
Stoicism we are unable to determine. He is more outspoken in 
deciding that the deity is not a personalized creator and bene-
factor, despite the allusions to charity, kindness, and bene-
volence, alt~ough he does stop short of telling us what God is, 
and how he reached this decision. Thus is proved again the 
difficulty of extracting nny consistent views from Seneca. With 
reason, then, did Capes preface his remarks with the conviction 
that "it has been said with truth that, as an author, Seneca 
should be regarded rather as a spiritual director than as a 
systematic moralist."l8 
More willing than any of the previously mentioned 
critics to accept the Christian expression of Seneca as well as 
the possibility of a Christian meaning is the author, Frederic 
W. Farrar, in his Seekers After ~· He will not accept an en-
tirely Christian view of God because "his(Seneca's) eloquent 
18 Capes , 143 
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utterances about God often degenerate into a vague Pantheism."l9 
He does admit, on the other hand, that there is about as much 
to be said for one side as for another when he writes that the 
"divergencies of Seneca from the spirit of Christianity are at 
least as remarkable as the closest of his resemblances."20 
To prove the resemblances to Christian principles Far-
far spends much of one chapter(Ch. 15) giving passages in 
Seneca that are parallel to those of Scripture and pointing out 
that "he(Seneca) was no apathetic, self-contained, impassible 
Stoic, but a passionate, warm-hearted man.tt21 We must wonder 
at Seneca's expression, if we follow Farrar, because he denies 
any intercourse between St. Paul and Seneca, and affirms, on 
the contrary, that Seneca, as well as Epictetus and Marcus 
• Aurelius, ignored and despised all Christians. Whence, there-
fore, does Farrar derive the material to make the following 
remark? "God was their God as well as ours - their Creator, 
their preserver, who left not Himself without witness among 
them ••• And His spirit was with them, dwelling within them, 
though unseen and unkno.,m, purifying and sanctifying the 
temple of their hearts. 1122 This statement is true enough, but 
the connotation that these three Romans recognized and under-
19 Frederic W. Farrar, Seekers After~~ New York, A.L. Burt 
Co., n.d., 183 
20 Farrar, 181 
21 Farrar, 184 
22 Farrar, 321 
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stood God in the same way as.the Christians did is something 
without any proof whatsoever. Also, it seems less likely, by 
Farrar's own admission, when we read: 11 Though there may be a 
vague sense in which these(Seneca's) words may be admitted and 
explained by Christians, yet, in the mind of Seneca, they led to 
conclusions directly opposed to those of Christianity."23 
Farrar approaches nearest to an examination of the deity 
on whom all his other discussions hinge in a short paragraph 
which leaves the question not entirely solved. 
He(Seneca) diverges from Christianity in many of his modes of 
regarding life, and in many of his most important beliefs. 
What, for instance, is his main conception of the Deity? 
Seneca is generally a Pantheist. No doubt he speaks of God's 
love and goodness, but with him God is no personal living 
Father, but the soul of the universe - the fiePy, primeval, 
eternal principle which transfuses an inert, and no less 
eternal, matter, and of which our souls are, as it were, but 
divine particles or passing sparks.24 
We find that Seneca is only "generally a Pantheist." Does 
this mean that Farrar's next few lines on the deity are to be 
understood in this light or in their literal meaning? Suppos-
ing that God "is no personal living Father," we have a greater 
problem in determining what he is. True, he is the 11 soul of 
the universe," which, in turn, is a principle transfusing 
matter. When Farrar speaks of a "fiery" principle, is he to 
be taken to mean something material? And, because this prin-
ciple 11 tnansfuses" matter must it also be comprised of things 
material? 
23 Farrar, 327 
24 Farrar, 326 
24 
The question is left unanswered, though it can be more 
easily deduced that the deity was the fiery matter present in 
every existing thing. Yet, even if this deduction is allowed, 
it is weakened by the force of Farrar's concluding words on 
Seneca. 
I cannot consent to leave him with the language of depreciation, 
and therefore here I will once more endorse what an anonymous 
writer ahs said of him: 'An unconscious Christianity covers 
all his sentiments. If the fair fame of the man is sullied, 
the aspiration to a higher life cannot be denied to the philo-
sopher; if tqe tinkling cymbal· of a stilted Stoicism sometimes 
sounds through the nobler music, it still leaves the truer 
melody vibrating on the ear.t25 
Therefore, is the true theme coursing through Seneca a Chris-
tian ~w of God? For that question again no hint of an answer 
has been given and no answer can be legitimately assumed. 
A very interesting study of the conflicting sentiments 
that Seneca causes to rise in his examiners is to be found in 
Semuel Dill's book, Roman Society~ Nero.:!?.£ Marcus Aurelius. 
According to one man "it is not too much to say that this ad-
mirable work is ~ guide to the complex period with which it 
deals.n26 Dill's opinion, therefore, can be expected to be the 
result of detailed investigation. 
Oddly enough, of all critics Dill takes the longest 
step towards Christianizing the words of Seneca. He begins 
25 Farrar, 331 
26 Robert M. Wenley, Stoicism and Its Influence, New York, 
Longmans, Green and Co., l9Wl'; '178, note 14 
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with the feeling that "the cold materialistic conception of 
God is irreconcilable with many passages in his(Seneca's) 
writings.n27 Still, Dill is forced to admit: 
In his views of the nature of God and His relation to the ex-
ternal world and the human soul, Seneca often seems to follow 
the old Stoic tradition. ~1ere are other passages where he 
seems to waver between different conceptions of God, the 
Creator of the universe, the incorporeal Reason, the divine 
breath diffused througn all things, great and small, Fate, or 
the immutable chain of interlinked causation.28 . 
As if this chain of thought brought new conclusions, Dill con-
tinues: 
He tends towards a more ethical conception of the Deity, as 
the Being, who loves and cares for ~en ••• Yet Seneca, in strict 
theory, PROBABLY never became a dissenter from the physical or 
ontological creed of his school. He adhered, in the last re-
sort, to the Stoic Pantheism, which represented God and the 
universe, force and formless matter, as ultimately issuing from 
the one substratum of the ethereal fire of HeraclitusA and in 
the great cataclysm, returning again to their source.~9 
He concedes Seneca's "ethical conception of the Deity,u but he 
has to allow also that Seneca "probably" remained Stoic, ma-
terialist, and Pantheist. 
There is another vista opened, however, in Dill's re-
joinder that Seneca "had absolutely broken with paganism.tt30 
Nor did he say this in a hesitating and doubtful manner. "Sen-
eca is far more modern and advanced than even the greatest of 
the Neo-Platonic school, just because he saw that the old 
27 Dill, 389 
28 Dill, 306 
29 Dill, 306 
30 Dill, 331 
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theology was hopelessly effete. He could never have joined in 
the last struggle of philosophic paganism with the Church. u31 
carried on by the enthusiasm of this last remark, Dill goes 
even farther from his original Stoic interpretations. 
He(Seneca) adheres formally to the lines of the old Stoic sys-
tem in his moments of calm logical consistency. But when the 
enthusiasm of humanity, the passion to win souls to goodness 
and moral truth is upon him, all the old philosophical differ-
ences fade, the new wine bursts the old bottles; the Platonic 
dualism, the eternal conflict of flesh and spirit, the Platonic 
vision of God, nay, a higher vision of the Creator, the pitiful 
and loving Guardian, the Giver of all good, the Power which 
draws us to Himself, who receives us at death, and in whom is 
our eternal beatitude, these ideas, so alien to the older 
Stoicism, transfigure its hardness and its cold, repellent mora 
idealism becomes a religion.32 
It is easy to detect in this passage Dill's attraction to the 
idealistic conception of God in Seneca. He thinks he sees 
Seneca adopt a dualistic philosophy and abandon the ancient 
materialistic monism of the Stoics. His eagerness to envision 
a spiritual explanation to Seneca's words is very evident in 
the preceding passage. He becomes even more definite after 
further consideration. "In Seneca he(God) develops into a 
moral and SPIRITUAL BEING, the source of all spiritual in-
tuition and virtuous emotion, the secret power within us making 
for righteousness, as he is the secret force in all nature 
making for order.n33 Nor is this just one isolated sentence. 
While not entirely neglecting certain Stoic tendencies in 
31 Dill, 330 
32 Dill, 304-5 
33 Dill, 307 
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seneca, Dill comes out directly to call God again a spiritual 
power, if not a person. "However loyal he may be in form to 
Stoic materialism, Seneca in the end regards God as no mere 
material force, however refined and etherealized, but a SPIRIT-
UAL POVVER: not perhaps limited by the .. bounds of personality, 
instinct with moral tendencies, nay, a moral impetus, which no 
mere physical force could ever develop. tt34 Here Dill seems to 
recognize the peculiarity of his position, insofar as he as-
serts Seneca formally adheres to Stoicism, but actually be-
lieves in dualism and the spirituality of God's nature. How-
ever, he does not see his way clear to accept any other ex-
planation. Besides, ·for him it is quite superficial to con-
trast materialist and idealist conceptions of God since he be-
lieves human thought and speech are incapable of escaping con-
tradictions in any consideration of God. "What human con-
ception of Him is free from similar contradictions? How can 
any conception of Him, expressed in human langua~e, avoid 
them?" 35 
This is Dill's final answer. God is material force; 
He is spiritual power. He says that there is a contradiction 
in the way Seneca presents these aspects of God, but that it is 
impossible to speak of God without these contradictions. With 
this statement Dill thinks he exonerates both himself and 
34 Dill, 307 
35 Dill, 307 
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seneca from the charge of being incomprehensible, or, at the 
very least, indecisive. 
It is quite remarkable to note how so many scholars 
have attempted to give their reactions to Seneca's words, and 
with a certain amount of consistency. Some, it is true, do not 
lmow what conclusions can be drawn from what they read, others 
do not believe Seneca had anything definite in mind, and still 
others thought he took these basic points for granted. There 
is a unity of belief amongst them, though, because a go·od se-
lection of quotations prove that most hold to the general tone 
of Stoicism in Seneca's writings. The question seems to be 
how much Seneca depended on Stoicism when he spoke of God. On 
this point, as we have noted, divergent opinions arose. There 
are shades of variance ranging from pure materialism up the 
scale to almost pure spirituality. And no two critics give 
quite the s~~e answer. 
Because of the wide range of opinions exhibited on this 
point, and because, with all due respect to the men who have 
formulated these views, a complete analysis of this question 
has been sidetracked for less confusing issues, there is still 
room for yet another examination of Seneca's philosophical 
.essays and letters. The following chapters will endeavor to 
arrive at so~e definitive answer to the question of the nature 
of Seneca's Supreme Being. This will be done by considering 
the various philosophical influences exercised on Seneca and 
29 
by studying the words of Seneca himself. Hence, by taking the 
latter in their literal meaning together with their relation to 
the former it will be possible to reach a solution for not the 
least of the problems to be found in Seneca's writings. 
CHAPTER III 
INFLUENCES ON SENECA 
Every great thinker, no matter how original his ideas, 
procedure, or conclusions, has in his lifetime been influenced 
by his teachers, readings, and associates. Some thought pro-
voking sentence or word coming from Democritus caused Epicurus 
to pause and consider the value of his atomic theory of the 
universe. Heraclitus 1 fiery TTIIVi'.P-0(. assisted the Stoics in form-
ing a stronger link between earth and heaven, between man and 
the ultimate principle of Being. Plato and Aristotle had their 
Socrates. As his predecessors Socrates possessed the Pytha-
goreans, Eleatics, and Milesians. In turn these men had in the 
preceding ages of history their wise men, their teachers, their 
exemplars. 
Seneca was no exception to this rule. Rather, he goes 
far beyond its simple proof. He lived in an age that had sus-
tained the weieht of many divergent philosophies for centuries. 
For one as interested in philosophy as he, this meant contact 
not merely with Academic or Peripatetic teachin.ss, but also 
with those other four current schools at Rome: the Sextii, 
Cynics, Epicureans, and Stoics. And it is from the latter 
group that Seneca especially received his early ideas and de-
31 
veloped his philosophical doctrines. 
Strangely enough, it is not to Plato and Aristotle that 
Seneca is indebted, but to what one man has termed the "lesser 
philosophies." However, this is quite understandable when we 
remember the character of the Roman people. For the Roman was 
a practical man above all else. The speculative abstractions 
in Plato's ideal world and the syllogistic exactness in Aris-
totle's metaphysical deductions either were too involved for 
him to bother about or made no sense after a cursory examin-
ation. It has been said, and rightly, that 
it was consistent with the Roman spirit, however, to estimate 
the worth of philosophy, as of all other things, primarily 
according to the standard of utility; and, on the contrary to 
ascribe no importance to scientific opinions as such, yhen no 
great influence on human life was perceptible in them. 
Thus the Sextii, the Cynics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics 
could attract the Roman because they, just as he, were inter-
ested in conduct, in "an applied science of life, offering for 
troublesome enigmas a solution. n2 Henry D. Sedgwick sums this 
quite well when he says: 
The Athenians demanded a metaphysical basis for their ethical 
creed, because by nature they took pleasure in abstract thought 
and academic disputations. The Romans, on the other hand, were 
a practical people, indifferent to metaphysics and science, but 
deeply interested in matters of conduct.3 
1 Eduard Zeller, A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophz, 
transl. by Sara F'. Alleyne, London, Longmans Green and Co., 
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Seneca himself we will find was no exception to this rule when 
we study at close hand the nature of his writing and the con-
tent of his teachings. But more immediately we must see that 
each of these currently popular philosophies had come into con-
tact with Seneca. This point requires little proof. In fact, 
it demands nothing more than a brief mention of a number of 
passages from Seneca's writings. 
First of all Seneca tells of his admiration for Quintus 
Sextius, the founder of the school which took his name. Sex-
tius had lived in the age of Augustus and had rejected a po-
litical career to give himself over completely to philosophy. 
One of his followers, Sotion of Alexandria, was an early pro-
fessor of Seneca and it was because of him that Seneca came to 
express his esteem for Sextius himself. This Seneca did in no 
uncertain terms and on frequent occasions. Two of the most 
lavish encomia are spoken in his Epistulae Morales. He says:: 
"Sextium ecce cum maxime lego, virum acrem, Graecis verbis, 
Romania moribus philosophantem."4 The expression "cum maxime 
lego" indicates the zeal and relish with which he went through 
this man's works. In another place Seneca fervently states: 
lectus est deinde liber Quinti Sextii patris, magni, si quid 
mihi credis, viri ••• Quantus in illo, di boni, vigor est, quan-
tum animil Hoc non in omnibus philosophis invenies; quorundam 
scripta clarum habentium nomen exanguia sunt. Instituunt, dis 
putant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum, quia non habent: cum 
legeris Sextium, dices: 'Vivit, viget, liber est, supra homine 
4 Ep. Mor. 59.7 
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est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae.5 
Besides these words of praise for Sextius, Seneca has incor-
porated many of his ideas, through his professor Sotion, into 
hiS own teaching. He approves of Sextius' abstinence,6 of his 
advice concerning anger,7 and of his examination of consciencefo 
Quite obviously Sextius and Sotion made a deep impression upon 
Seneca and must be reckoned as guiding his development. 
Another early teacher of Seneca is mentioned often and 
with feeling in the letters to Lucilius. It is not often that 
a student tries to be the first to school and the last to de-
part. Still, that was the effect of Attalus on the young Sen-
eca. He recalls this in rather effusive fashion. "Haec nob.ls 
praecipere Attalum memini, cum scholam ejus opsideremus et 
primi veniremus et novissimi exiremus, ambulantem quoque i1lum 
ad aliquas disputationes evocaremus, non ~antum paratum dis-
centibus, sed obvium." 9 Later he reminisces:. "Attalum memini 
cum magna admiratione omnium haec dicere.ttlO Undoubtedly it 
was through his efforts that Seneca became an eager admirer and 
panegyrist of Stoic principles. For Attalus was very definitel 
a Stoic and a forceful one at that. He spoke with such con-
viction of the value of poverty, for instance, that Seneca said 
5 Ep. Mor. 64.2-3 
6 Ep. Mor. 108.17 
7 De Ira 2.36.1 
8 De Ira 3.36.1 
9 Ep. Mor. 108.3 
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he wished to leave the lecture room a poor man. "Saepe exire 
e schola pauperi libuit.nll In a following letterl2 Seneca de-
votes great space to presenting Attalus' opinion of theworth-
lessness of riches. Seneca gives full-voiced approval to all 
that Attalus says when he remarks t~at by imitating Attalus' 
advice you will be striving for actual happiness and not for its 
mere appearance. "Haec nobis Attalus dixit: quae si voles fre-
quenter cogitare, id ages, ut sis felix, non ut videaris, et ut 
tibi videaris, non aliis."13 Thus do we find the Stoic element 
moving and forming to a certain degree the thoughts that were 
to flow from the pen of Seneca. 
Epicureanism, likewise, receives frequent mention in 
Seneca's works, but nowhere as in his De~ Beata does he 
praise its position quite so vigorously. 
In ea quidem ipse sententia sum ••• sancta Epicurum et vita prae-
cipere et, si propius arcesseris, tristia; voluptas enim illa 
ad parvum et exile revocatur et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus, 
eam ille dicit voluptati~ jubet illam parere naturae.l4 
Later he continues: "Itaque non dicam ••• sectam Epicuri flagi-
tiorum magistram esse, sed illud dico: male audit, infamis est, 
et innnerito.nl5 But these selections are not all. In many of 
his early Epistulae Morales Seneca closes with a short saying 
of Epicurus by which he presses some practical point for Lu-
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cilius to ponder and to carry into execution. "Honesta res est 
laeta paupertas" is the bit of advice with which he concludes 
Letter Two. "Magnae divitiae sunt lege naturae composita pau-
pertas" ends Letter Four; and in Letter Eight Seneca has it 
that "philosophiae servias oportet ut tibi contingat vera li-
bertas ." Letters Twelve, T'nirteen, Fourteen, Sixteen, Seyen-
teen, Eighteen, and Twenty One, to consider just a few of the 
earlier letters, all quote with complete approbation some se-
lect bit of Epicurean advice. In this wise Seneca plainly 
shows a thorough knowledge of Epicurus and his agreement with at 
least certain Epicurean teachings. This means also that it was 
possible for Seneca to have chosen part of the Epicurean 
physics, metaphysics, and theolog-y for himself. 
The last group that played an important part in forming 
Seneca's phil:)sophical doctrines were the Cynics. These men 
must be mentioned, however, not because of any special favor 
they received in Seneca's eyes, but rather because they con-
stituted a negative norm of his beliefs. Seneca did not take 
issue with the character of every individual Cynic because, of 
Demetrius, he must admit "egregie enim hoc dicere Demetrius Cyn 
icus, vir meo judicio magnus, etiam si maximis comparetur;"l6 
but of their doctrines and mode of life he apparently can find 
nothing worthy of approval. Speaking to a Cynic who asks for 
money after expressing a hatred of it, Seneca says: "Indixisti 
16 De Ben. 7.1.3 
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pecuniae odium ; hoc professus es, hanc personam induisti: 
agenda est.nl7 Then in the De Brevitate Vitae he states what 
seems to him a distinctive feature of various schools in the 
words: "Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubi tare cum Carneade, cum 
Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum 
Cynicis excedere.nl8 There is no odious attachment to any of 
these epithets except that applied to the Cynics. Discussion, 
doubt, peace, and virtue are all in accord with human nature. 
It is left to the Cynics alone "excedere hominis naturam.tt In 
looking at their concept of God, then, we must remember that 
seneca stood in opposition to their manner of seeking happiness 
and for.their explanation, or lack of explanation, of the ul-
timate principles of· the universe. For ttthe Cynic is opposed 
to the whole world; he need.s for virtue no scientific knowledge 
of the world and its laws; he regards nothing external to him-
self; he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and.attaches 
value to nothing. ttl9 
These were the four groups, then, that played an impor-
tant part in developing and advancing the theories and appli-
cations of morality that Seneca was to propound in his writings. 
All scholars agree that Seneca followed the Stoic school of 
thought in general outline. It would be practically impossible 
17 De Ben. 2.16.2 
18 De Brev. v. 14.2 
19 Eduard Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, ~ Sceptics, transl. by 
Oswald J. Reichel, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1892, 
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to prove anything else when Seneca uses the words nos and nos-
tros in speaking of the Stoics in many passages. Besides, the 
-
high praise which he renders to their teachers, propositions, 
and to their way of life all point to his approval of their po-
sition. Still, it must be remembered that 
in Seneca, the freer position in regard to the doctrine of his 
school which he claimed for himself, is shown in his views con-
cerning the end and problem in philosophy. If in the original 
tendencies of Stoicism there already lay a preponderance of the 
practical interest over the theoretical, with Seneca this was 
so greatly increased that he regarded many things considered by 
the older teachers of the school to be essential constituents 
of philosophy as unnecessary and superfluous.20 
Seneca also indicates his free use of other than Stoic ideas in 
admitting "quicquid bene dictum est ab ullo, meum est,n21 and 
again in asking of Lueilius, "quid enim nocet alienis uti ex 
parte qua nostra sunt?"22 And he proceeds in the first in-
stance to quote Epicurus and in the second Plato. 
Since Seneca has manifested a certain trend toward ec-
lecticism in his doctrines, it makes the investigation of the 
schools influencing him all the more important. We will con-
sider in succession the concept of God as proposed by the Cyn-
ics, the Sextii, the Epicureans, and the Stoics before ad-
vancing to the study of Seneca in his essays and letters. More-
over, since the physics of the Stoics and Epicureans is in 
reality the basis of their explanation of God, it is also 
20 Zeller, Hist. of Eclect., 204-5 
21 Ep. Mor. 16.7 
22 De Ira 1.6.5 
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necessary to give a complete picture of their natural science. 
This procedure is not superfluous in the least. Instead, it 
contains ~ germine the ultimate answer to the question of this 
thesis. For after studying Seneca's words, ideas, and modes 
of expression concerning the deity, it becomes necessary to find 
in what light these utterances are to be valued. What is Fate 
to signify? Or Fortune? Or Nature? What is the nature of the 
being that corresponds to this terminology? This can only be 
understood by considering Seneca's explanation of the universe. 
And his conclusions concerning the universe will be more easily 
interpreted when measured against the schools of thought that 
came to have such an important place in his education and in 
his writings. These were the Cynics, the Sextii, the Epicu-
reans, and the Stoics. 
SECTION A 
THE CYNICS 
Whether the followers of Antisthenes received the name 
"Cynics" from the gymnasium Cynosarges in whieh they held 
school or whether from the type of life they led, popular be-
lief is more in favor of the second possibility. 
Although Antisthenes had been a devoted disciple of 
Socrates, he lacked the broad view of the true philosopher. Or, 
perhaps, it was because he was such a devout believer in Soc-
rates that his outlook on philosophy had become narrow. For 
"what Antisthenes had most admired and imitated in Socrates was 
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his independence of character; on t~1is account he attached no 
value to scientific investigation in so far as it had no direct 
bearing on active life.n 23 
From that moment the die was cast. "Cynicism remained 
to the end a mode of life rather than a system of thought. n24 
Art, learning, mathematics, science were all considered worth-
less. Only virtue was good and vice alone was evil. 
Since the only good for man is what is appropriate(o~KttoV ) to 
him and this is nothing more than his mental and spiritual pos-
sessions, everything else, fortune, honour, freedom, health, 
life itself, are in themselves not goods, nor are poverty, 
shame, slavery, i~lness and death in themselves evils; least of 
all should pleasure be regarded as a good and toil and labour 
as an evil; since the former, when it becomes a man's master, 
corrupts him, while the latter nay teach him vlirtue.25 
Thus the precepts of a practical morality constituted the whole 
. 
of philosophy for the Cynics. 
But even that is not worthy of condemnation. It was 
the manner in which they believed that virtue was to be ac-
quired and the explanation of virtue that merited for them the 
title, "dog-like" philosophers. 
As was said, Antisthenes admired the independence of 
Socrates. ·rn his own philosophy then he wished "to isolate the 
individual and maintain his independence, his natural f'reedom 
23 Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 108-9 
24 Paul E. More, HelleniStic Philosophies, Princeton, Prince-
ton University Press, 1923, 72 
25 Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 109 
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and self-sufficiency. Indeed, to Antisthenes, the autonomy of 
the individual, his independence of everything but himself, 
seemed of itself to constitute that supreme good which Socrates 
had taught him to seek.n26 In other words, this is a negation 
of any bondage. Self is asserted against everything that be-
longs to the not-self; the individual demands to be his own law 
and end. 
In this way the Cynics were occupied with the negative 
side of philosophy. The1r "activity was taken up in the mani-
festation of hatred for institutions and principles of a soci~ 
which seemed to hinder the expression of one's individuality.'e 
Naturally they were revolutionists, ready to dissolve the 
family and society, just to bring men back to nature. The 
Cynics, however, 
interpreted the precept 1Follow Nature' negatively and destruc-
tively by ridiculing the institutions of his country and the 
very idea of patriotism and by making a violent protest in his 
daily life and behaviour against the traditional code and the 
established order. This nature became almost another name for 
anarchism and unparalleled license was permitted to individual 
caprice.28 
With this interpretation of life it was impossible for 
the Cynics to maintain any serio~s form of religion. For in 
arming man against man they also armed him against heaven. We 
would even suppose that the Cynic would neglect religion and 
26 Caird, 62 
27 Caird, 72 
28 Robert D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, London, Longmans 
Green and Co., 1911, 10---
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God completely. William L. Davidson in The Stoic Creed offers 
a possible answer to this paradox. 
~hen we remember his(Cynic's) acceptance of the primitive man 
as his model for life and conduct, we can readily see that he 
could not consistently have done it. For, to primitive men 
were due the gods and the accredited mythologies; and so these 
mythologies must somehow be accepted, if we are to return to a 
life conformable with nature. Obviously, however, they could 
not be accepted by philosophers in their bare literality, and 
so they must be allegorized.29 
Were there actually any gods then? Zeller says the Cynics held 
that "only convention created the multitude of godstt30 and that 
"they treated the religious beliefs and cults of their people 
in a spirit of enlightenment. tt31 The Cynics, '::owever, would 
not even give lip service to the accredited for.m of worship. 
And the reason stemmed from Antisthenes' denial of the spiritua 
side of Socratic teach1ng. Antisthenes was a materialist and 
accepted Nature as he saw it. "Antisthenes, apparently, was 
what Plato would call a semi-atheist: some kind of God he ac-
cepted as a power more or less identical with Nature; but it 
was a God rer'ote from mankind, while the popular worship ••• was 
to the Cynic a matter of jest and contempt."32 
Thus there was some sort of God for the Cynic, but the 
popular gods he termed allegorical. And the God he did admit 
was material and, perhaps, identified w1th Nature. As to the 
29 Davidson, 136 
30 Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 110 
31 Zeller, Outlines of the History 01 Greek Philosophy, 110 
32 More, 66 
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actual essence of God, his attributes, his rela.t ions to nen and 
the world the Cynic tells nothing. Man alone and his conduct 
are of interest to Antisthenes and the rest of his followers. 
SECTION B 
THE SEXTII 
This little-known and short-lived school of philosophy 
played more than a passing part in Seneca's life. It had been 
founded by Quintus Sext~_us, a Roman, somewhere around 40 B.c. 
After his death its teachings were handed down first by his son 
and then by Sotion of Alexandria, Cornelius Celsus, Lucius Cras-
sitius of Tarentum, and Fabianus Papirius. But the school was 
little-known and short-lived precisely because its mark was left 
only by the individual named. 
S·eneca, however, we have seen, in his early youth had 
been an admirer of this school and frequently praised its foun 
in his Epistles. The reason for this praise lies, no doubt, in 
his contact with above named Sotion of Alexandria. In one 
letter33 Seneca says he was a puer and in another34 he calls 
himself a juvenis at the time he eagerly listened to the words 
of Sotion. 
But what influence might these men have had on Seneca's 
philosophy~ "The writings of t}·lis school, too, have all been 
33 Ep. Mor. 49.2 
34 Ep. Mor. 108.17 
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lost, with exception of some scattered utterances of the 
elder Sextius, of Sotion, and Fabianus.n35 The important thing 
to note is that in the writings that did remain there was 
nothing different from the teachings of Stoicism. True, the 
sextii were more exclusively intent upon ethics than the Stoics, 
but in what they both treated their doctrines were the same. 
They, too, held that all syllogistic tricery is a waste of ef-
fort unless some moral principle is thereby to be inculcated. 
We must also always be in readiness to strike down that great 
enemy of man, folly. 
The closest thing, however, to any mention of their 
view of God is reported to us by Seneca and that statement is in 
\ 
entire accord with the Stoic teaching. "Solebat Sextius dicere 
Jovem plus non posse quam bonum virum.n36 The Stoics say the 
same thing when they mention that "bonus tempore tantum a deo 
differt."37 What the Stoic view of God was in its completeness 
will be seen later on; the opinions of the Sextii, for all prac-
tical purposes, may be declared the same. 
Zeller sums up the work of the Sextii very well by stat-
ing that 
we therefore find nothing in their school that is new and scien-
tifically noticeable; it is a branch of Stoicism, which doubt-
less is indebted to the personality of its founder that it had 
35 Zeller, Hist. of Eclect., 182 
36 Ep. Mor. 73.12--
37 De Prov. 1.6 
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an independent existence for a time. 38 
If the Sextii did influence Seneca to any extent, they 
merely augmented and stre~hened the Stoic ideas that he was al-
ready receiving in abundance from Attalus, another of his early 
teachers. 
SECTION C 
THE EPICUREAN"S 
Epicurus and his disciples were no different from the 
Cynics, Sextii, and Stoics in giving their attention predomin-
antly to the study of ethics. Their position, however, is some-
what unique in that they tried to weave a physical pattern into 
the univ·erse in order to justify the quest of pleasure, the ob-
ject of their philosophy. And herein lies the extraordinary 
paradox of Epicurean logic. It "begins with regarding pleasure 
as the only positive good and ends by emptying pleasure of all 
positive content.tt39 Epicurus admitted this visible world of 
bodies as the only reality, and believed that the only thing 
which has any certain value to man is his own immediate physical 
sensatio.::Ls. But, since it was harder to keep pain from the body 
at the very time of seeking pleasures, Epicurus was driven into 
a purely defensive attitude of life. Vfuile avowedly looking for 
positive pleasure he actually spent his time warding off the 
38 Zeller, Hist. of Eclect., 188 
39 More, 20 
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more disagreeable elements of life. And one of the greatest of 
these was the so-called fear of the gods. This accounts for 
his explanation of the gods, as we shall soon see. 
It must be said to Epicurus' praise that he was able to 
see "t':1at you cannot have ethical doctrine without a basis of 
physical and metaphysical doctrine; you can have no rule of 
conduct without some view of the universe wherein the action is 
to take place.tt40 Still, he looked at this principle from such 
an angle as to make it explain the preconceived notions he had 
formulated on pleasure and the greatest enemy of pleasure, the 
fear of the gods. Epicurus believed that any supernat~ral in-
fluence in the world deprived man of his peace of mind and kept 
him in constant fear. Hence he attempted to develop a system 
of physics and metaphysics to explain away any and all super-
natural power the gods might exert over the destinies of men. 
Since Epicurus was not interested in natural science 
for its own sake, he was content to offer merely a general ex-
planation of the world. He wished to say only as much as 
necessary to renove the fear of the gods and to indicate that 
all natural phenomena can be explained by natural causes. And 
even in desiring to do this he was unwilling to, or incapable 
of, making new studies before presenting his own case. There-
fore, 
40 Edwyn Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1913, 31 
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confining his interest in nature, as Epicurus did, entirely to 
this general view of things, he was all the more inclined, in 
carrying it out into details, to rely upon some older system. 
No system, however, appeared to correspond better with his tone 
of mind than that of Democritus, which commended itself to him 
••• by referring everything to matter, and by its theory of 
atoms.41 
Democritean atomism best suited Epicurus' "tone of mind" be-
cause for Epicurus the alm of philosophy was to promote human 
happiness with each individual being the ultimate end of all 
action, whereas with Delnocritus all that is real is individual 
atoms. For both, then, what is individual is the only reality. 
Hence, the natural science of Democritus seemed to present the 
best basis for the Epicurean ethics. 
were the basic constituents of all things for Democritus. 
Therefore, they were the basic constituents for Epicurus. 
But what did all this entail? It meant that the only 
reality is corporeal substance as divined in the ultimate 
atomic particles. These atoms also have always existed and 
will never cease to exist because they cannot be divided any 
further into nothingness and destroy the first precept of Democ 
. ritean natural science, namely, that nothing can come from 
nothing and nothing can be resolved into nothing. Then to ex-
plain the origin of the world Democritus had stated that a 
large number of these atoms had gathered in this particular 
' "' section of the To K.evov • At some later date plants, animals, 
and men apparently just happened to come into existence by some 
41 Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 438 
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fortuitous association of atoms, for on this point Epicureanism 
is strangiy silent. 
However, did all this affect the popular belief in the 
gods? Epicurus was sure it did. W"ith the atomic system as the 
ultimate cause of all things, we would think that Epicurus had 
abolished the gpds completely and that he had lapsed into com-
plete atheism. 
But here, for one reason or another, he drew back. Though the 
thought of Providence was utterly repugnant to him, and though 
he swept away, with one grand gesture of disdain the whole fab-
ric of signs and portents and prophecy, he still in a fashion 
clung to the existence of the gods.42 
This is just another Epicurean paradox. Freedom from fear is 
the primary aim of his philosophy. And Epicurus associated re-
ligion and the gods with this fear. Nevertheless, he did not 
abolish the gods as his physics seemed to postulate. Why? 
He did not, however, make any attack on belief in the gods, 
partly because the universality of this belief seemed to prove 
that it rested on real existence, and that the images from the 
appeara::1ce of which alone he can explain it arise at least part-
ly from real things and are therefore perceptions and not merely 
ima~ined images; partly, because he himself felt the need of be-
holding his idea of happiness realized in the gods.43 
Of these three reasons for retaining the gods the last opens the 
way to the Epicurean concept of the gods. 
Since human beings alone appear in any concepts that 
arise in our waking mind and in any dreams to represent the 
42 More, 41-42 
43 Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 237 
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gods, it stands to reason, so say the Epicureans, that the gods 
are human beings. Upon consideration we realize that the human 
form is the most beautiful and that man alone is endowed with 
the great faculty of the intellect. Cicero in his De Natura 
Deorum44 even had Epicurus attribute the difference of sex to 
the gods. 
The gods have two attributes that are very proper to 
their being, perfect happiness and immortality. However, the 
gods could not possess such qualities if the atoms comprising 
their bodies were as dense as those in human bodies. Thus, they 
have bodies t 11at consist of atoms that are tenues, perlucidi, 
and perflabiles. Because bodies of this sort would have dif-
ficulty in existing in a world such as ours Epicurus places the 
abode of the gods in a region between the worlds, the intermun-
dia. 
Living as these gods do apart from the world, they 
cannot be expected to be interested in the affairs of men. 
Moreover, how could they possibly enjoy complete happiness if 
they were burdened by the cares of the world? And in what did 
the happiness of the gods consist? 
The gods were exempt from sleep, sleep being a partial death, 
and not needed by beings who live without any exertion ••• Were 
powers of speech to be refused them, they would be deprived of 
the highest means of enjoyment - the power of conversing with 
their equals .45 
44 Henry Rackham, ed. and transl., De Natura Deorum, London, 
William Heinemann, n.d., 1.34.95 
45 Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 468 
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In brief, these gods possess everything they could possibly 
desire. Why should they be interested in, or angry at, the 
deeds of men? 
As-difficult to understand as it may seem, Epicurus 
built up an entire section of physics in his philosophy to dis-
prove the popular beliefs in religion and the gods only to use 
this same system to explain another set of deities more in 
accord with the fundamental aim of his ethical doctrines. 
Logically he should have been an atheist, proposing as he did 
his materialistic and monistic casualism. But after all his 
scientific meanderings he finally allowed a vast system of 
carefree, blissful, and disinterested gods anyway. 
SECTION D 
THE STOICS 
Like the Epicureans the Stoics gave an explanation of 
the physical universe as the basis of their concept of God. 
However, unlike the Epicureans they made an earnest effort to 
delve into the secrets of nature and God's being. The ·Epi-
cureans, we recall, cared nothing for science. T-hey used it 
only to give an apparent logic to their principles of pleasure 
and exclusion of any supernatural force on the lives of men. 
Though the Stoics were interested primarily in ethics, 
since their philosophy was concerned with right action and vir-
tue, they still saw that right action was rational action. And, 
50 
in turn, rational action is action that is in harmony with hu-
man nature and physical nature. Hence the Stoic principle 
vivere secundum naturam expressed a twofold purpose. Conduct 
and virtue flowed from the individual, but for such action to 
be good was impossible unless the individual was in harmony 
with the laws of the universe. In this way the Stoic physical 
philosophy received more attention than would have been other-
wise devoted to it. Still, even in the physical examination of 
the universe their 
physical philosophy came to be that which should rather be 
called metaphysica or theology, the part which has to do, not 
with the relations of physical phenomena to each other, but 
only with relations of the material universe to God.46 
In searching through the physical world for the ulti-
mate principle of Being, Zeno came to the conclusion that any-
thing is real that can act or be acted upon, 'T~ rrotf.L'I/ r, Kclt · 
I ff~~E~~. Following the guidance of his senses Zeno at once 
limited reality to corporeal or material objects. There were 
innumerable difficulties brought forward against this bold 
statement. For, how could virtue, passion, emotion, day, 
month fall under this definition? Were these bodies? The 
Stoic answered that the things comn1only considered incorporeal 
were in actuality only material when you investigated them 
closely enough. "It must be remarked that the Stoics dis-
tinguish between a finer and a coarser materialn47 and that 
46 Caird, 93 
47 William Turner, History of Philosophy, New York, Ginn and 
Co., 1929, 167 
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"the common distinction between corporeal and incorporeal is 
merely a distinction between coarser and finer matter."48 Not 
much of an explanation to be sure, but they offered it anyway 
as being consistent with the principles that were originally 
postulated. 
Once the Stoics committed themselves to t-~1is fundamenta 
explanation of physical nature it was easy to foresee, at least 
in general, the course that their entire physics would follow. 
The whole world was either a vast materialistic machine or a 
powerful dynamic material force. God in either case for the 
Stoic was to be something material, whether it be gross matter 
or active force. The complete answer, however, lies much mor~ 
beneath the surface. 
Matter alone was the only reality for the Stoics, but 
this they interpreted differently than the Epicureans. The 
latter also believed in materialism, but they maintained the 
universe was a machine made up of fine atoms. Thus the Epicur-
eans placed the idea of matter as foremost in their explanation 
The Stoics, however, placed force above matter. Matter was 
still the basis of all things, but it was matter in action. 
There really was only one element in nature, but it was viewed 
''l / under two aspects. The first was v~~ nrw•~ , primordial 
matter; the passive element from which all things were formed. 
48 Turner, 168 
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The second was the active element, wl1ich forms things out of 
matter. This active element they further called the efficient 
cause of all things. And, as there is just one matter, there 
can be but one cause, since matter and force, or cause, are 
identical. It follows, then, that everything that exists or 
happens is due to this one efficient cause. 
Reverting to a fundamental principle of Stoic physics 
that everything that acts is material, they said that the ef-
ficient cause was likewise material. But what was the nature 
of this efficient cause? 
Falling back upon the ancient hylozoistic philosophy which 
found the source of nature in some one primordial stuff possess 
ing the characteristics of life, and more particularly upon 
Heraclitus, he(Zeno) declared that the universal substratum of 
things was fire, or an element like fire in its fineness and 
fluidity. 49 
Everywhere heat is seen as the germinative power of life and 
growth. All things, also, have their own heat, and are pre~ 
served in life by the heat of the sun. Naturally, they said, 
what applies to parts· of the world must be appli_ed to the 
whole. Since heat or fire has this actuating and preserving 
force, this ttis the power to .which the life and existence of 
of the world must be referred.n50 Or, as Cicero quotes the 
Stoics in his De Natura Deorum, 11 Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes 
mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili 
49 More, 78 
50 Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 144 
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parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eQque magis quod 
intelligi debet, calidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum 
esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis.n 5l 
From this point the Stoic conclusions are drawn without 
hesitation. This same world, which is the offspring of the one 
fiery element, manifests such great beauty, completeness, and 
order that there must be design or a plan behind it. Then, too, 
man possesses reason. How could he, a part of the world, have 
this power, unless t~:1e whole world held it first of all 'Z Cicero 
adds another reason taken from Zeno as he remarks: "Zeno enim 
ita concludit: quod ratione utitur, mellus est, quam id, quod 
ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur 
mundus utitur.tt52 Moreover, there are creatures on the earth 
endowed with consciousness and a soul. 'J.herefore, the world 
itself is conscious, has a soul. In brief, then, the universe 
N 
is basically a material force which consists of the Tr't'Eufoc., 
or artificial fire, possessing consciousness, a soul, and even 
"' reason. ThisiTVEU~~ with its qualities animates all things and 
I 
contains the a"lTEf ~Q(-rotJ , or seeds, of all forms of being within 
itself. 
One could question further into the nature of the Soul 
of the universe and the meaning of Reason, since this termin-
51 De Nat. D. 2.9.23 
52 De Nat. D. 3.9.22 
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ology inserts an element of spirituality into the materialism 
already proposed. These names also lead us to the very thres-
hold of the Stoic deity. However, such an investigation would 
not render much satisfaction, for the same question has been in 
the mind of many scholars for years. One gives up in disgust, 
bemoaning the Stoic vagueness and lack of analysis. "Reason? 
Yes, but what did this mean? This surely is just one of the 
points where Stoicism,in its haste to construct a dogmatic sys-
tem for popular use, stops short with a vague and unanalysed 
concept. n53 Let us not be thwarted, however, by failing to 
understand this one term. Zeno postulated complete dynamistic 
materialism. That we know for certain. The difficulty arises 
when Zeno, or Cleanthes, or Cicero uses terminology which, 
according to present interpretation, has a spiritual meaning. 
Following this lead, we think the ancient Stoics contradict 
themselves at every step when in one instance Fire is the bas~ 
of all things, and in another Reason seems to be ruling the 
universe. We are incapable of juxtaposing or equating Fire and 
Reason. That leads Caird to conclude that 11 Stoicism seems very 
confusing because in the exposition of unity it passes abruptly 
from materialism to spiritualism, from individualism to pan-
theism.tt54 And Bevan states that 
on the material side the doctrine conveys an~prehensible 
meaning; we can picture more or less a huge fiery sphere in 
empty space. On its spiritual side, it is harder to make sense 
of. For, to begin with, we can do little with a conception 
53 Bevan, 47 
54 Caird 82 
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which identifies Reason with a material substance. 55 
Very probably the Stoics did not intend any spiritual interpre-
tation to be attached to Soul, Reason, or Providence. Sedgwick 
in a remarkable analysis explains everything according to the 
materialistic principles postulated by the ancient Stoics. 
If we fix our attention on the orderly course of nature, on the 
steady sequence of phenomena, and especially upon the inexor-
able constraint in the lives of men, this cosmic energy assumes 
the aspect that we call FATE. But if we shift our attention to 
the relation of cause and ~ffrct, and ponder upon the cause of 
causes, the power becomes ~l t' lc(, which corresponds after a 
fashion to the modern term FIRST CAUSE. Or, again, if we look 
at the universe from a biological point of view and concern 
ourselves mainly with the processes of life in animate creation, 
then, under that aspect, this power finds a more appropriate 
name as NATURE, the principle,of growth and organic changes, 
for which the Greek word is cpu~ I~. And, finally, if we reflect 
on the marvellous adaptation of part to part, how all things 
subserve other interests, how plan and purpose seem to run 
through the whole system, more especially if we feel gratitude 
and are able to pronounce the universe good, in that case the 
power assunes a sort of personality and becomes lTjovoLOII , 
PROVIDENCE. 56 
But what of Reason? It also fits into the same plan. When 
this primary material element works accord1.ng to set laws, 
then it is called Reason. Thus, Reason, in reality, is not 
the spiritual or intellectual faculty that we know. It is 
merely the basic Fire of the world considered as universal Law, 
as the systematic course of the world's movements and changes!i7 
As confusing and contradictory as the language of the 
Stoics is at first glance it all becomes clear when we follow 
55 Bevan, 51 
56 Sedgwick, 264 
57 Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 216 
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logically from the first principles of their physics. Those 
principles are purely materialistic and with no admixture of 
spirituality. The Stoic conception of the deity, likewise, is 
understandable enough when examined in the same logical manner. 
The foregoing investigation into the physical makeup of 
the universe has really presented the nature of the Stoic di-
vinity. For, when the Stoics speak of God as Fire, Ether,V"oU's , 
"V / JTVEvfot.,, Trfovot.~, Universal Law, Nature, Fate, or Providence, 
they mean one, and only one, thing. The terms simply signify 
various aspects of the one prj_mary force-laden matter penetrat-
ing the universe. It is unimportant whether the original ele-
ment is called Heat, Air-Current, Fire, or Ether, for all are 
likewise of a material essence. 
Somewhat confused by the widely variant phraseology of 
the Stoics certain philosophers think that "Stoic theology is 
an attempt to compromise between theism and pantheism.n58 They 
obviously find themselves, without realizing it, considering 
certain Christian aspects of such terms as heason and Soul. But 
neither, on the one hand, can they they avoid the very material 
significance of Efficient Cause, Nature, Fire, and Matter. In 
a word, they are confronted with the same difficulty that was 
presented in the Stoic system of physics. ~ince the ultimate 
58 Alfred Weber, Historz of Rhilosoph~, transl. by Frank Thilly 
New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons, I 03, 143; also Turner, 168 
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principle of Being is the same in each case, there can only be 
one conclusion. If the First Gause and primary source of things 
is material Fire for the Stoic physicist, it must be for the 
stoic theologian as well, unless, of course, there is objective 
evidence to the contrary. And there is none. 
The consistent view has been crystallized by Ralph Stob 
in his article, "Stoicism and Ghristiani ty, tt for the Classical 
Journal. He says: "Stoicism has neither an ultimate spirit, nor 
an ultimate personality. For this same fiery substance is 
everywhere, in man, the material universe, the heavenly bodies. 
This is the all pervading divinity.n59 Thus, God is not a 
spirit, and he is not a person. Is God any kind of being dis-
tinct from the universe? No. The universe and God are the 
same reality. The varied terminology expresses only different 
manifestations of the same being. Sedgwick's application and 
interpretation of Fate, Nature, Providence, and First Gause in 
the Stoic physics holds true here also because the ~ indepen-
dens must be the same no matter what science we are consider-
ing. 
If we call to mind once more the original premise of 
the Stoics that that alone is real which has a material form 
and is of a material nature, the problem of uniting the mater-
ial and the spiritual in God disappears, just as it did in the 
59 Stob, Classical Journal, 30.219 
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analysis of the Stoic ultimate principle in physics. Although 
God is called the Soul, va~5 1 or Reason, the words mean nothing 
spiritual, but presuppose that these conceptions have bodies, 
just as anything else that is real. Hence, we must agree with 
Zeller that 
those who charge the Stoics with inconsistency for calling God 
at one time Reason, at another Soul of the Universe, at another 
Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the Universe, forget 
that they are attaching to these terms a meaning entirely dif-
ferent from that in which they were used.60 
And how were they used? To signify various aspects of the one 
fiery substance intermingling with and penetrating all things. 
God, then, is the ultimate and basic matter of the universe 
constantly expressing itself in various forms. In other words, 
God is prime matter in action. However, this prime matter is 
not the same uninformed~ quo of Aristotle, but it is matter, 
an~ quod, as being replete with force and complete in itself. 
From this Stoic logic it must follow that the system 
was completely pantheistic. The only reality was contained in 
matter and the productive power which formed the matter into 
the individual objects. But this reality was called the deity. 
God, therefore, was the world, and the world was God. Or, as 
Cicero says: "hunc nmndum ••• animantem esse et Deum.tt61 
Everything that exists, therefore, is part of the deity. 
Even in speaking of "gods" the Stoics do not contradict their 
basic explanation of deity. The term "gods" merely indicates 
60 
61 
Zeller, Stoics, E~icureans, and Sceptics, 155 
De Nat. D. 2.!7.4 ---
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special phases or manifestations of the monistic material prin-
ciple of Being which is "revealed either in the stars or in the 
forces of nature.n62 
In conclusion, the Stoic physics was monistic, mater-
ialistic, and pantheistic. God for the Stoics was the basic 
material element, Fire, changing itself into the various forms 
of material substances that exist in the world about us, al-
though he is never distinct or separate from these substances. 
_ ... ____ _ 
The foregoing presentation has given the basic con-
cepts held by various schools of thought concerning the nature 
of the deity. It has studied, also, the sources of these con-
cepts in the science of physics. It was these same schools 
that exercised their power over Seneca, and, it is to be sup-
posed, molded his ideas of philosophy. An investigation of 
Seneca's own philosophical essays and letters will now prove 
whether his concept of the deity was patterned after any of the 
systems already explained, or whether he chose select bits of 
each system to assist him in expounding whatever ethical point 
he was discussing at the moment. 
Further, these ideas will be weighed against Seneca's 
thoughts on the basic organization of the universe. Both of 
62 Weber, 143 
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these, in turn, will be measured against the philosophies ex-
plained in this chapter. By comparing the relation of Seneca's 
theology and physics with one another, and, then, with the 
ideas complied in this chapter, we should be able to decide the 
nature of the Senecan Supreme Being without fear of contra-
diction. 
CHAPTER IV 
SENECA SPEAKS 
In Seneca's many essays and letters there are certain 
points that are immediately clear, but a good number are al-
most impossible to catalogue even after many readings. Seneca 
was definitely a Roman philosopher. As "Roman" stood for prac-
ticality and "Roman philosopherrt for ethician or moralist, we 
know what broad pattern Seneca is to follow in his works. He 
treats of Physics, it is true, but he cares little for that 
subject in itself. And in Logic he has no interest whatsoever. 
Per ~ he is interested only in happiness and how man can best 
achieve it. 
Any study of Seneca that lies beyond this focal point 
meets with immediate difficulties. As was mentioned earlier, 
problems arise because of Seneca's lack of system, incoherency, 
and inconsistency. We need only recall that these three are 
not insurmountable barriers. The first and the second can be 
eltminated by exhaustive research and by compilation of the 
matter pertaining to the thesis topic; the third is overcome by 
analysis. This present chapter is concerned primarily with 
this third problem. The complete list of passages found help-
ful in arriving at the solution of the problem can be found in 
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the appendix of this thesis. Here we will analyze the termin-
ology that gives rise to Seneca's inconsistency and resolve the 
obscurity by certain deductions. 
The beginning of all confusion occurs when Seneca seems 
to postulate four great powers in the world: Fate, Nature, For-
tune, and God. In no one place does he pause to tell us in 
what or of what the essence of these 11beingstt consists. For 
Seneca always addressed his essays to a particular individual 
who, we presume, lmew what Seneca implied in each instance. 
With us, however, it is different. When Seneca speaks of For-
tune as a force against which there is no defence, 11Nullus au-
tem contra fortunam inexpugnabilis murus est ;ttl of Nature as th 
power that gives us our life, "Non tam benignum ac liberale 
tempus natura nobis dedit, ut aliquid ex illo vacet perdere; 112 
of Fate as the ruler of life's span, "Alium alio tempore fata 
comprehendunt, neminem praeteribunt ; 113 of God as the most powep. 
ful of beings, "deus ille maxinms potentissimusque ipse vehi t 
omnia,n4 we have apparently four distinct supreme forces in the 
universe. By merely following the individual usage of the 
sixty to one hundred references to these terms in Seneca's 
works we could possibly draw that conclusion. However, in the 
Fourth Book of the De Beneficiis Seneca indicates the identity 
1 Ep. Mor. 74.19 
2 Ep. Mor. 117.32 
3 Ad Polyb. 11.4 
4 Ep. Mor. 31.10 
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of all these terms. We are amazed to discover that these are 
not four powers at all, but only one. 
V.fuen Seneca says that God really implants in us our 
talents ("magisterque ex occulto deus producit ingeniatt5), some 
one offers the objection that nature bestows these on him. 6 
To this Seneca replies: "Non intellegis te, cum hoc dicis, nru-
tare nomen deo? Quid enim aliud est natura quam deus et di-
vina ratio toti mundo partibusque ejus inserta?n7 He adds that 
"nee natura sine deo est nee deus sine natura, sed idem est 
utrumque, distat officio."B Later God is called Fate when 
Seneca says: "Rune eundem et Patum si dixeris, non mentieris; 
nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, 
ille est prima o:nmium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent .n9 The 
most important statement, however, comes as a summary of the 
preceding quotations. "Sic nunc naturam voca, fatum, fortunam; 
onmia ejusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.nlO 
Fate, Fortune, and Nature all stand for the same God. The 
difference in name does not mean a multiplication of beings. 
Seneca makes this clear by using his own name as an example. 
11Si quod a Seneca accepisses, Annaeo te debere diceres vel Lu-
cio, non creditorem mutares, sed nomen, quoniam, sive prae-
5 De Ben. 4.6.6 
6 De Ben. 4.7.1 
7 De Ben. 4.7.1 
8 De Ben. 4.8.3 
9 De Ben. 4.7.2 
10 De Ben. 4.8.3 
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nomen ejus sive nomen dixisses sive cognomen idem tamen ille 
est.nll As Seneca is just one and the same person whether you 
call him Lucius, Annaeus, or 3eneca, so God is the same whether 
you call him Fate, Fortune, Nature, or God. 
Before we can understand the full meaning of God for 
Seneca, therefore, we must consider the many individual refer-
ences to Fate, Nature, and Fortune, as well as to God, in his 
letters and essays. This plan is necessitated by the fact that 
Seneca nowhere gives a direct definition for any of these im-
portant words. From their various applications we must attempt 
to deduce the one basic meaning attached to these words. This 
idea will either give or lead to the nature or essence of God, 
the "maximus potentissimusquett Being of the universe. In the 
following sections of this chapter the terms Fate, Nature, 
Fortune, and God will be examined in an effort to capture the 
one significant note attached to each by t"1eir author. 
SECTION A 
FATE 
Seneca gives fewer references to Fate in his writings 
than to the other terms to be studied, but he comes closer to 
giving an exact definition for this word than he does for the 
others. There are three notes that seem to be the outstanding 
characteristics of Fate. It springs from a central cause, is 
11 De Ben. 4.8.3 
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inexorable, and deals with man's span of life. Fate more 
fundamentally is interpreted as an inexorabl.e course of events 
in a ~uman being's life; these events flow from a central cause 
and terminate only with death. 
In the Quaestiones Naturales Seneca says that one is 
not wrong in calling God by the name of Fate. "Vis illum fa tum 
vocare, non errabj_s • 11 He then continues: 11Hic est, ex quo sus-
pensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. 1112 Here obviously God viewed 
as Fate is looked upon as woven from the succession of causes 
flowing from this first cause. "Dicimus seriem esse causarum 
ex quibus nectitur fatum.ul3 Then, once the course of events 
is set into motion there is no drawing back. 
Cursum inrevocabilem ingressa ex destinate fluunt. Quemad-
modum rapidorum aqua torrentium in se non recurrit nee moratur 
quidem quia priorern superveniens praecipitat; sic ordinem fati 
rerum aeterna series rotat, cujus haec prima lex est; stare 
decreto •14 
As if this description would not satisfy his reader, Seneca 
repeats the question and the answer. "Q.uid enim intelligis 
fatum? Existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam 
nulla vis rumpat.ttl5 But Seneca reserves his strongest language 
to impress Polybius with the immutability of Fate. "Diutius 
12 Fredericus Haase, ed., Annaei ~enecae Opera, Leipzig, B.G. 
~eubner, 1887, Quaest. Nat. 2.45.2 
13 Ep. Mor. 19.6 
14 Quaest. Nat. 2.35 
15 Quaest. Nat. 2.36 
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accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus. Stant dura et in-
exorabilia; nemo illa convicio, nemo fletu, nemo causa movet; 
nihil umquam ulli parcunt nee remi ttunt. "16 
In all these quotations Seneca has indicated that Fate 
signifies the original cause, as well as the succession of 
causes, of a series of unchanr~eable events. These notions, 
however, are incomplete until we understand over what events 
Fate exercises its power. Does Seneca believe that everything, 
including man's will, has been determined ad unum ever since 
the succession of causes was set in motion? Definitely not. 
In very striking fashion practically all Seneca's remaining 
references to Fate deal with the inevitability of death. This 
is our fate. This is the inexorable end to every man's exist-
ence. A succession of causes leads us to the completion of 
life's span whether we wish to die or not. "Alium alio tempore 
fata comprehendent, neminem praeteribunt.nl7 
Nothing can be added to life's span or subtracted from 
it. "Eunt via sua fata nee adiciunt quicquam nee ex promisso 
semel demunt.n18 Thus, it makes no difference who the person 
mlght happen to be. Seneca was surprised when Annaeus Serenus, 
a young friend, died. He muses that "hoc unum mihi occurrebat, 
minorem esse et multo minorem, tamquam ordinem fata servarent~ 
16 Ad Polyb. 4.1 
17 Ad Polyb. 11.3 
18 Ad Marc. 21.6 
19 Ep. Mor. 63.14 
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In like manner old men think that they are younger than they 
really are, and believe that death is thus staved off, but 
Seneca says: "Mendacio sibi blandiuntur et tam lib enter se 
fallunt quam si una fata decipiant." 20 nlus·young and old 
alike are taken from this world when their fixed and unchange-
able date of death arrives. We might as well be reconciled to 
this ltfate" because "stat quidem terminus nobis, ubi illum in-
exorabilis fatorum necessitas fixit.n21 
Fate and God, therefore, are the same being, but Fate 
is, in this instance, merely one phase or manifestation of 
God's essence. ~~is manifestation centers itself on the 
necessity of death for every human being. This idea is ex-
pressed in various ways and in different relations to God, but 
the meaning never changes. Our life springs from God, the 
first cause. Then through a succession of causes we lead our 
life and are finally brought to a death that is called nre-
morseless" or "inexorable" because no one can avoid it. Fate 
merely expresses the inevitability of death that flows from 
the very essence of human nature. Fate, therefore, is not 
something distinct from God, and does not have any separate 
existence. It is first of all used by Seneca to describe the 
definite limitation placed upon a creature's extstence by 
reason of his human essence or nature. Then, when considered 
20 De Brev. v. 11.1 
21 Ep. Mor. 101.8 
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in itself, it signifies the first cause of all men and events 
of life. And these events lead inescapably to man's departure 
from. life. 
SECTION B 
:NATURE 
:Nature is a term found in Seneca's writings more than 
sixty times with a variety of possible interpretations. Seneca 
says that we would commit no fault in calling God by this name. 
"Vis illum naturam vocare; non peccabis. n22 The reason innned-
iately follows. "Hie est ex quo nata sunt omnia, cujus spiritu 
vivimus.n23 :Nature, therefore, is God considered as the source 
of life and the principle of its continuation. This seems a 
simple concept until one analyzes the many functions and char-
acteristics of Nature. It is then that all ideas of a per-
sonal creator and divine providence are replaced by the vague-
ness and confusion of a materialistic world. It is then that 
one begins to foresee what the Supreme Being will ultimately be 
discovered to be. 
Nature is the life-giving principle in the world. "Na-
tura subolem novam gignitn24 and took thought of us before 
bringing us into existence.25 Each one when brought into the 
22 Quaest. Nat. 2.45.2 
23 Quaest. Nat. 2.45.2 
24 De Ben. 1.11.1 
25 De Ben. 6.23.6 
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world receives his own special character W}lich it :i.s hard to 
change, as "naturam quidem mutare difficile est, nee licet seme 
mixta nascentium elementa convertere.n 26 No one can blame Na-
ture for his condition, however, because man is not a hasty or 
purposeless creation,27 but is such a marvelous creature that 
among the greatest of her works Nature has none of which she 
can more boast. 28 The main reason for this is man's intellect. 
Having this he surpasses all beings and needs nothing more.29 
Still, Nature was lavish in bestowing many other faculties on 
man since we have received our feet and eyes from her as well.3 
Together with these faculties Nature produced ~en in health and 
freedom.31 And all this came to man from Nature so that he 
needs little else for happiness.32 As for happiness, that is 
ac~ieved by a man ttqui natura magistra uti tur"33 and has as his 
definite aim "secundum naturam suam vivere.tt34 However, if one 
works against Nature, his life is no different from that of one 
who struggles against the very order of things.35 
If into a man's life material adversities should come, 
26 De Ira 2.20.2 
27 De Ben. 6.23.6 
28 De Ben. 6 .23.7 
29 De Ira 1.17.2 
30 Ep. Ivior. 55.1 
31 Ep. Mor. 94.56 
32 Ad Helv. 5.1 
33 Ep. Mor. 45.9 . 
34 Ep; Mor. 41.9 
35 Ep. Mor. 122.19 
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however, he will merely say: "Non vides qualem nobis vitam 
rerum. natura promiserit, quae primum nascentium hominum fletum 
esse voluit?"36 After all, when death or captivity or disaster 
comes, none of them is unexpected, for we always knew in what 
37 disorderly company Nature had confined us. A man naturally 
expects some difficulties and he recognizes that every hardship 
that time brings comes by a law of Nature. 38 
Misfortune, moreover, strikes harder at some men than 
at others. When that happens, people should understand that 
those who are treated most kindly by Nature are those whom she 
removes early to a place of safety.39 It might be best that 
such a man die at once, but Nature did give us the means to 
cope with whatever problem besets us. "Ad quaecumque nos coge-
bat instruxit.n40 And not the least of our equipment is for-
titude of spirit. 41 
Life, besides, will not last forever. Nor does Nature 
testify that she exempts any man from this law of death, for 
"natura nulli se necessitatis suae gratiam facturam esse tes-
tata est.u42 For the man who has been crushed by material 
losses Natura has given a great blessing in her law of death. 
36 Ad Polyb. 4.3 
37 De Tranq. An. 11.6 
38 De V. B. 15.5 
39 Ad Marc. 22.3 
40 Ep. Mor. 90.16 
41 Ep. Mor. 104.23 
42 Ad Polyb. 11.1 
71 
He should rejoice in this discovery of Nature and look forward 
to the day of his release from his sorrows. "O ignaros malorum 
suorum quibus non mors ut optimum inventum naturae laudatur ex-
pectaturque.n43 If one believes death 1 s release is still too 
far distant, he may use any portion of Nature to provide himself 
with a means of early departure from life. 
Nemo te tenet; evade quo visum est. Elige quamlibet rerum 
naturae partem, quam tibi praebere exitum jubeas. Haec nempe 
sunt elementa, quibus hie mundus administratur, aqua, terra, 
spiritus. Omnia ista tam causae vivendi sunt quam viae mortis.44 
One very obvious fact stands out in all the foregoing 
examples. Nature, indeed, as was first stated, is the source of 
life and the principle of its continuation, but this power is 
not distinct from God. Moreover, we have seen that, over and 
above this, Nature is not distinct from man. It is his own phy-
sical, human makeup. Nature only means man as viewed from the 
standpoint of a creature possessing all the processes of or-
ganic life and the principle of growth and change. Also, by 
reason of this type of life man's existence must terminate with-
in a short span of years. Thus, when Seneca says that Nature 
forms man, or gives.him certain traits, or health, or sickness, 
or death, he just means that man is born, lives, and dies ac-
cording to the laws of his physical being. 
That, however, is just half the picture. Man is only 
part of the universe. Birth, growth, change, and death all 
43 Ad Marc. 20.1 
44 Ep. Mor. 117.23 
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play their part in the rest of the world as well. We receive a. 
clue as to Seneca's meaning of Nature in reference to the wide 
universe when he says. that we should use any part of Nature we 
wish, as earth, water, or air, to put an end to our unpleasant 
existence(Ep. Mor. 117.23). Nature in this sense signifies the 
physical and mechanical operation and essence of the world at 
large. 
In two rather lengthy descriptions of the workings of 
the universe Seneca indicates that Nature is merely this same 
universe following her own set laws and acting a.ccordi~g to her 
own principle of being. Nature, he says, orders the heavens, 
changes the seasons, and brings to an end all things t~at have 
ever existed, while she herself exists forever. "Scimu.s a. qui-
bus principiis natura se a.dtolla.t; quema.dmodum ordinet mundum, 
per qua.s annum vices revocet, quemadmodum omnia. quae usque era.n 
cluserit et se ipsam finem sui fecerit.tt45 To change the 
seasons and moderate the weather is another of Nature's func-
46 tions. The planets also are regulated and ordered in their 
movements according to laws of Na.ture. 47 In this way 
the heavens, the seasons are seen to act according to an or-
dered arrangement and motion until the time comes for all thin 
to be resolved into their original primal fire. Until that 
ti'Tle Nature deals wlth matter as she pleases because she is 
45 Ep. Mor. 93.9 
46 Ep. Mor. 107.8 
47 Ad Helv. 6.7-8 
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matter. "Utatur ut vult suis natura corporibus.«48 We should 
recall also that when Nature is about to return to f'ire("re-
cessura in ignem") nothing of ours is destroyed( 11nihil perire 
de nostrott49). Nature, in this sense, is ·distinct f'rom, al-
though in an earlier explanation the term stood f'or man in his 
organic composition. Here it stands f'or the world viewed as 
the principle of' operation. Nature is the earth, air, planets, 
and water continuing to act systematically according to their 
own essence until the moment arrives for them to revert by thei 
very "nature11 or essence to the one original substance, primal 
fire. 11 Quicquid composit, resolvit.n50 
With this explanation of' Nature it is a simple matter 
to show the relation between Fate and Nature. In f'act, Seneca 
indirectly mentions their identity by stating that people rail 
unjustly at Fate when a young person is carried away in death, 
for it is more fair that we obey Nature than that Nature obey 
us. "Objurgamus cotidie f'atum: 'quare ille in medic cursu rap-
tus est? Quare ille non rapitur? Quare senectutem et sibi et 
aliis gravem extendit?' Utrum, obsecro te, aequius iudicas te 
naturae an tibi parere naturam.n51 Very obviously Seneca uses 
these terms in the senses we have already off'ered. Fate and 
Nature are the same concept ultimately. For, in reality, by 
48 De Prov. 5.8 
49 De Ben. 4.8.1 
50 Ep. Mor. 30.12 
51 Ep. Mor. 93.1-2 
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complaining of Fate we complain of the inevitability of death 
which is part of man's Nature. Fate, then, expresses the ne-
gation of immortality in man's physical composite, his Nature. 
The same holds true if we view the world or the universe 
as a whole. It, too, operates according to a set plan of cause 
and effect(Fate) until a time when its principle of operation 
(Nature) grows weary of fulfilling j_ ts works and returns into 
primal fire.52 
SECTION C 
FORTUNE 
Of the four terms under consideration, intangibility 
renders Fortune by far the ~oat difficult to grasp, analyze, and 
define. Here, as before, there are numerous references, some 
seventy in number, to th-i_s power in the universe. In this case, 
however, the references have greater extent of application. 
They also are used with greater vagueness and in more abstruse 
language. Naturally, there is no statement that even mildly 
approaches the form of a definition. A list of the references 
to Fortune included in the Appendix will make clear the variety 
of source material to be analyzed and then synthesized into 
one compact idea. 
The first concept of general impression one receives 
when he hears Seneca speak of Fortune is that of adversity. 
52 De Ben. 4.8.1 
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Fortune seems to forbode evil, material loss, uneasiness, and 
dissatisfaction with life. Even Fate was never pictured as 
stern as Fortune. And Nature appeared in a favorable light, or 
was at least viewed indifferently as the existing order of 
things. Not Fortune, however. It is something that man must 
beware and guard against. This is a tone created by various 
striking passages. Is it really the picture that Seneca wished 
to leave, or will an investigation lead one to a different con-
elusion? 
There can be no doubt that Fortune plays an important 
part in man's life. Seneca likes to picture it as a powerful 
force which leaves nothing free from assault. In faet, the 
more prosperous or brilliant a thing, man, or the state happens 
to be, the more subject it is to decline and destruction. "Quid 
enim est quod non fortuna, cum voluit, ex florentissimo detra-
hat? Quod non eo magis adgrediatur et quatiat quo speciosus 
fulget.n53 But everyone who puts trust in material things is 
bound by this power in some way or other. "Alium honores, alium 
opes vineiunt; quosdam nobilitas, quosdam humilitas premit; qui-
busdam aliena supra caput i~mperia sunt, quibusdam sua; quosdam 
exil1a uno loco tenant, quosdam sacerdotia.n54 For all of these 
people life is a complete slavery.55 
53 Ep. Mor. 91.4 
54 De Tranq. An. 10.3 
55 De Tranq. An. 10.4 
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This last statement of Seneca, however, is conditioned 
by circumstances and a man's frame of mind. For material riche 
and prosperity are ttadventicia et nutum fortunae sequentia.n56 
Fortune also exercises her power only over those who desire to 
rely on her. "Non habet, ut putamus, fortuna longas manus; 
neminem occupat nisi haerentem sibi. tt 57 Even though Fortune 
might appear to have assisted a certain individual by providing 
great worldly possessions,58 she still threatens him as much as 
she had previously assisted him.59 Actually it is just at the 
time of success that a man should fear the violence of Fortune 
and prepare himself against it.60 
It is true that Fortune frequently bestows external 
gifts, but it is precisely at this moment that one places him-
self in Fortune's grasp, for the individual has put his trust 
in something other than virtue which alone is the object of 
man's existence. 
Nam qui aliquid virtute melius putat aut ullum praeter illam 
bonum, ad haec quae a fortuna sparguntur, sinum expandit et 
sollicitus missilia ejus expectat. Hanc enim imaginem animo 
tuo propane, ludos facere fortunam et in hunc mortalium coetum 
honores, divitias, gratiam excutere, quorum alia inter diri-
pentium !i1anus scissa sunt, alia infida societate dieisa, alia 
magno detrimento eorum, in quos devenerant, prensa. 
This is a sad picture of enslavement to "''ortune. It was in-
56 De Constant. 5.7 
57 Ep. Mor. 82.6 
58 Ad Polyb. 18.3 
59 Ep. Mor. 4.7 
60 Ep. Mar. 18.6 
61 Ep. Mar. 74.6-7 
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evitable; man had made an alliance w~th pleasure and refused to 
follow virtue alone. 
Qui vero virtutis voluptatisque societatem faci t et ne ex aequo 
quidem, fragilitate alterius ooni quicquid in altero vigoris 
est hebetat libertatemque illam, ita demum, si nihil se pre-
tiosius novit, invictam, sub iujum mittit. Nam, quae maxima 
servitus est, incipit illi opus esse fortuna.62 
It is good to accept whatever Portune offers, as Seneca himself 
did, as long as we remember that these things are transitory 
and insecure. nQ.uicquid a fortuna datum est, tamquam exempto 
auctore possideas.n63 Nevertheless, the best policy is not to 
trust Fortune at all. "Numquam ego fortunae credidi, etiam cum 
videretur pacem agere.n64 Seneca says this because no man is 
crushed by hostile Fortune who is not first deceived by her 
smiles.65 But, if favorable Fortune, which also quickly shifts 
its favor,66 gets one in her power, she ultimately brings him 
to ruin. "Illi qui munera ejus velut sua et perpetua amaverunt 
qui se suspici propter illa voluerunt, iacent et maerent, cu:m 
vanos et pueriles animos omnis solidae voluptatis ignaros, 
falsa et mobilia oblectamenta destituunt.n67 
However, no one needs to place himself in Fortune's 
grasp. We are so constituted that we can and ought to seek 
riches within ourselves rather than from fortune.68 In this 
62 De V. B. 15.3 
63 Ad Marc. 10.3 
64 Ad Helv. 5.4 
65 Ad Helv. 5.4 
66 Ad Polyb. 9.4 
67 Ad Helv. 5.5 
68 De Tranq. An. 9.2 
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indifference to things of Fortune lies true freedom. "Ergo 
exeundum ad libertatem est. Hanc non alia res tribuit quam for 
tunae neglegentia.n69 The best possible way to refuse these 
temptings of F'ortune is the remembrance that Fortune has no 
power over one's character.70 After all, what Fortune did not 
give she cannot take away.71 And, as ueneca has said, true 
riches of character and peace of soul are found without the 
assistance of external riches and worldly advancement. In fact, 
virtue is the treasure of life, whereas Fortune's "gifts" can 
be sources of discomfort, sorrow, and discot~agement, insofar 
as Fortune modifies the issues of even the best plans.72 Thus 
the person with fewer possessions is less subject to Fortune's 
blows.73 On the other hand, the man who engages in business on 
a gigantic scale is the more subject to Fortune.74 
Since there is no place where Fortune cannot assault 
anyone[5 the only safe harbor is scorn of the future, a firm 
stand, a readiness to receive Fortune's missiles full in the 
breast, neither skulking nor turning one's back. 76 And this 
man is safe because he has abandoned material things ~d pro-
tected himself within the impregnable wall of philosophy. 
69 De V. B. 4.5 
70 Ep. Mor. 36.6 
71 Ep. Mor. 59.18 
72 De Ben. 5.2.2 
73 De Tranq. An. 8.9 
74 De Tranq. An. 13.2 
75 De Tranq. An. 4.2 
76 Ep. Mor. 104.22 
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11 Philasophia circurndanda est, inexpugnabilis munus, quem .for-
tuna multis machinis lacessitum non transit. In insuperabili 
loco stat animus, qui externa deseruit.tt 77 However, i.f Fortune 
has attempted to do battle with such an individual, she has 
always been ignominiously de.feated. 78 This wise man never had 
to .fear .from Fortune79 nor does he have to retreat .from Fortune 
He has nothing to lose .from her.80 He will parry her blows wit 
ease81 and with a serene mind82 and an unru.ff~ed spirit83 over-
come Fortune by his virtue.84 Since he has defeated Fortune, 
there can be no one above the wise man.85 For now the vicis-
situdes o.f life have been subordinated to a higher principle, 
that o.f considering all honors, wealth, and material possessicns 
as a hindrance rather than an aid to the acquirement o.f true 
happiness. Seneca .felt that he himself had achieved a certain 
amount o.f success over Fortune since he despised riches when 
he had them and also when he lost them. 86 Over and above this, 
his contempt .for her power extended into the entj_re realm o.f 
Fortune. 11 Totum .fortunae regnum despiciam. 11 87. In this way he 
intimates that he has arrived at the state o.f bliss he is 
preaching in his many treatises, although he explicitly states, 
77 Ep. Mor. 82.5 
78 De Constant. 8.3 
79 De Prov. 6.6 
80 De Tranq. An. 13.2 
81 De Clem. 2.6.3 
82 De Ira 3.25.4 
83 Ad Marc. 5.6 
84 Ep. Mor. 91.30 
85 De Brev. v. 5.3 
86 De V. B. 20.3 
De V. B. 25.5 
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in all humility, that he is still far from the goal of perfect 
happiness which is derived from the practice of all the virtues. 
In all the preceding quotations the diversity of For-
tune's activities becomes apparent. Still, beneath all this 
there shines forth a certain unlty. Fortune ls some force 
which assaults everything in the world, 88 especially people who 
place their trust in worldly honors and material possessions. 
It is also a power capable of bestowing these gifts on man-
kind.89 It seems, therefore, that Fortune is nothing more than 
the changing circumstances in a man's life. rrhe stress, how-
ever, is very definitely placed on the loss of honors and pos-
sessions. For these are more subject to human fickleness, 
weakness, and malice. Whereas these material goods are more 
liable to be lost, peace of soul can be permanent because the 
virtuous or wise man does not rely on anything material. He 
knows that true riches are to be found within his own heart, 
while external, material things are purely transitory. 
This is the summation of all Seneca's references to 
Fortune, but still we ask, "v'Vhat is lt'ortune?" Is it a material 
force in the universe exercising its power over human puppets? 
Is it a person controlling the destinies of his creatures? Or 
is it merely a name given loosely by Seneca to indicate the 
88 Ad Marc. 26.6 
89 De Clem. 1.1.2 
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loss of material things or to point out oecurrences which are 
without apparent meaning and explanation? 90 This last seems to 
be most logical from all the foregoing passages, but it is also 
the most difficult to fit into any pattern with the conclusions 
arrived at in the analysis of Fate and Nature. Seneca, as 
stated before, nowhere answers this question himself. What 
Fortune means to him is best stated in the oft repeated quo-
tation: "Sic nunc naturam voca fatum, fortunam; omnia ejusdem 
dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.n91 And this re-
ference cannot be fully understood until all four terms are 
examined, especially in the light of Seneca's words on the im-
port~t word deus. Fortune, in particular, has a real meaning 
and existence only when identified with deus.92 It is impos-
sible, therefore, to reach any further conclusion until the 
last word under consideration is studied in completest detail. 
SECTION D 
GOD 
When cataloguing all the references Seneca gives to 
the deity, one is immediately conscious of two things, his 
practicality and apparent lack of exactness and consistency. 
Seneca is practical because he was a moralist above all else. 
But also, as is the case with many men who do not have clear 
90 E. Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1911, 210 
91 De Ben. 4 • 8 • 3 
92 Arnold, 209 
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concepts of very fundamental principles, Seneca's explanations 
were directed to the solution of an immediate case without 
attempting to reconcile his present answer to a previously elab-
orated explanation on somewhat the same matter. 
Seneca speaks at times almost as if he had been a dis-
ciple and believer in Christianity, perhaps through the teach-
ing of the apostle St. Paul. He says, for instance, that God, 
who is the Father of us all, has placed ready to our hands thos 
things which he intended for our own good; he did not wait for 
any search on our part, and he gave them to us voluntarily. 93 
As a benefactor, then, he would be greater than the recipient 
of his gifts, but Seneca elsewhere states that man is on a 
94 level with God if he only possesses perfect reason. Accord-
ing to Christian thought it is impossible to reconcile any 
equality between God and man. 1hus, Seneca adds to his and our 
confusion by speaking on the one hand of the Patherhood of God, 
and then on the other of the equality of man and God in all but 
immortality.95 Having in mind the solution of people's prob-
lems, Seneca very likely gave no thought to the inconsistency 
that arose in his doctrines. Or, if he did consider such dis-
crepancies, he knew of no way to solve the difficrtlties wh.ich 
he himself unknowingly proposed. We find a typical example in 
the case of the same God who previously, unasked, lavished his 
93 Ep. Mor. 110.10 
94 Ep. Mor. 124.21 
95 De Constant. 8.2 
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gifts on us, failing to heed our earnest prayers. 96 Later on 
Seneca changes this attitude when he argues that people would 
not supplicate God if he were deaf and ineffectual, or if his 
benefits were not bestowed on those who sought them.97 God in 
one instance hears our prayers and even grants our desires be-
fore we ask for anything. With equal definiteness in another set 
of circumstances we hear him saying it is a waste of time to pra-y 
to God, for he will not hear or answer our petitions. 
The only possible way to arrive at a well-defined pic-
ture of the deity in the midst of these contradictions is to 
list whatever attributes Seneca assigns to his Supreme Being 
and determine the spiritual or material essence whence these 
powers flow. The investigation will reveal, in other words, 
what God does and what God is. 
The deity of Seneca resembles in many ways the God of 
the Christians in the manifestation of his qualities. First 
of all, God is the master builder of the universe who preserves 
all things by his power and "conservat art if ex fragili tat em 
materiae vi sua vincens.n98 Still, he does not violate the 
course of Fate, or the series of cause and effect, once he has 
ordained the definite nature of a certain creature. 99 "Deo 
96 De Ira 2.30.2 
97 De Ben. 4.4 .2 
98 Ep. Mor. 58.28 
99 De Prov. 5.9 
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agenteulOO the universe moves on its prearranged schedule and 
nmanent cuncta, non quia aeterna sunt, sed quia defenduntur 
cura regentis.nlOl In this function God evidently is "omnia 
habentem, o:rnnia tribuentem, beneficum gratis. nl02 Manifesting 
this care for his creatures, "Deus qnoque quaedam munera uni-
verso humano generi dedit, a quibus excludltur nemo.nl03 For 
a moment, too, Seneca wishes us to ponder how much God, our 
loving parent, has given to us.l04 For in t~e world about us 
the artifex has cared that each object has its om1 distinctive 
features(ttnulli non et color proprlus est et flgura sua et 
ma,-snitudoul05). And certainly it must be attributed to the 
remarkable genius o:f the divine creator that amid all this 
106 
abundance there is no repetition. 
Upon man in particular the deity wished to pour his 
favors. To him he gave the wonderful faculty of ratio by 
which man partoolc of the nature of God himself and became the 
lord of the world. ttDuas deus res dedit, quae illum obnoxium 
validissimum facerent, rationem et societatem; itaque qui par 
esse nulli posset, si seduceretur, rerum potitur.nl07 Having 
given this fellowship with himself, God has greater watch over 
100 Ep. Mor. 71.12 
101 Ep. Mor. 58.28 
102 Ep. Mor. 95.48 
103 De Ben. 4.28.3 
104 De Ben. 2.29.4 
105 Ep. Mor. 113.15 
106 Ep. Mor. 113.16 
107 De Ben. 4.18.3 
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rational creatures. "Nihil deo clusum est. Interest animis 
nostris et co~itationibus mediis intervenit.nl08 And there 
God is tb.e "malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et cus-
tos.nl09 Moreover, to show his interest in mankind he disci-
plines those whom he loves 110 when they have need of' a stimulus 
to practice virtue. 
Af'ter listening to Seneca speak of the deity in this 
fashion, one f'eels that God is truly parens noster, guiding us 
wl th a loving hand in the whole span of our lif'e. We have 
visions of a personal, kind, loving f'ather providentially con-
trolling tne events of' our lif'e and we seek to know yet more 
about him. Seneca gives one reason to wonder and then to doubt 
about the truth of this picture, however, because he hesitates 
to say what God actually is, and then even describes him in a 
very materialistic tone. Seneca states openly that our in-
tellectual faculty will tell us what the gods are. "Quid sint 
di qualesque declarat(ratio) .ulll Still, he does not explain 
what his reason has pointed out. Certainly it is the part of' 
a wise Y'l.an, which Seneca was striving to become, to study the 
universe, its beginnings, and its artifex. Thus he asks with 
amazement: "Non quaeram quis sit istius artif'ex mundi?11112 
108 Ep. Mor. 83.1 
109 Ep. Mor. 41.2 
110 De Prov. 4.7 
111 Ep. Mor. 90.28 
112 Ep. Mor. 65.19 
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But he passes on without studying the artifex mundi. In 
another place he expresses asain the importance of knowing 
God's essence,ll3 but fails to say more on the subject. The 
same question is introduced in other passages 114 with the same 
result. 
Certainly even with Seneca's lack of directness all 
that has just been mentioned leads to one conclusion thus far. 
Vfuen God possesses, allots, bestows, controls, views, corrects 
everything in the universe, we have attributes that uni:t;e per-
fectly to form a spiritual ttrectorem custodemque universi, ani-
mum ac spiritum mundi, operis hujus dominum et artificem.ull5 
Moreover, when asking what the one true cause was, Seneca re-
sponds "ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus.ull6 Besides "sa-
cer intra nos spiritus sedet, 11117 who again is God, since Seneca 
has just finished saying that 11 prope a te deus, tecum est, intus 
est.nll8 
This language, taken in itself, tells clearly enough 
that Seneca believed in the spiritual essence of God. If God 
is the causa or animus or ratio faciens or sacer spiritus, then 
Seneca seems to be following the Christian concept of God. The 
113 De Brev. V. 19.1 
114 De Otio 4.2; Ad Helv. 8.3 
115 Quaest. Nat. 2.45.2 
116 Ep. Mor. 65.12 
117 Ep. Mor. 41.2 
118 Ep. Mor. 41.1 
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casual observer w·ould im..rneqiately concur in this opinion since 
Seneca says in several letters that there are corporeal and in-
corporeal beinss, 119 and that our intellect is capable of fix-
ing its attention on the incorporeal.120 Seneca maintains also 
that nduo esse in rerum natura ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et' 
materiam.nl21 Matter lies inert, ready for any use, but surely 
to stay as it is if not acted upon the Efficient Cause. For 
"causa aut em, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult 
versat, ex illa varia opera producit.nl22 This causa or ratio, 
as we have seen, is God. Later on in this same letter Seneca 
repeats this. 11 Universa ex materia et ex Deo constant ••. Poten-
tius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam 
materia patiens dei.ul23 God, therefore, is distinct from 
matter and is the Cause forming matter. Since another name for 
causa is ratio and deus, one still retains the concept of the 
spirituality of God's essence. The answer would be reached and 
the investigation completed if Seneca had stopped here. But he 
did not. For again we are confronted with a series of contra-
dictionS"' that demand further study. 
Whereas up to this point God has been covered with the 
robe of spirituality, we now discover t~e shadow of materialism 
changing the original hues of this robe. Seneca had admitted 
119 Ep. Mor. 58.11 
120 Ep. Mor. 90.29 
121 Ep. Mor. 65.2 
122 Ep. Mor. 65.2 
123 Ep. ·Mor. 65.23 
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the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substances, 
leading one to think that he acknowledga:i the existence of a 
spiritual essence or nature in the deity. However, following 
his usual line of inconsistency, Seneca denies his previous 
statements by recognizing the existence of material or cor-
poreal substances only. He does not directly postulate this 
in a·'l.y one place, bPt the numerous sugeestj..ons to and appli-
cations of such a principle leaves no doubt ~ut that he be-
lieved it to be true. The general principle w' lich Seneca 
follows assumes that whatever is capable of acting or being 
acted upon alone is possessed of any reality. The contention 
that only corporeal objects exist is reached by restricting the 
power of acting or being acted upon to purely material things. 
God, as the ruler, guardian, soul, breath, lord, and 
master-builder of the world, possesses force and power at his 
command. The very names used to describe God signify his po-
sition and his activity. But for Seneca "cui tanta vis est ut 
impellat et cogat et retineat et inhibeat, corpus est.nl24 
This, indeed, is not the only passage which shows that the dei 
j_s nothing more than matter. For Seneca reaffirms his con-
vic.tion that whatever possesses the principle of activity is 
purely material and does not rise above anything else in the 
universe. He says in Letter 106: "Quod facit, corpus est. 11 125 
124 Ep. Mor. 106.9 
125 Ep. Mor. 106.4 
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This sets the stage for a very similar statement in a subse-
q-~Jent letter, in which he writes: "Quidquid facit, corpus 
est.n126 Since God under his many titles is ultimately the 
causa efficiens, t 11.en, he too j_s material in essence because, 
again, everything which acts is material. 
Seneca comes yet closer to this position when he affir 
in Letter 95: "Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana 
conclusa sunt, unum est; membra sumus corporis magni. 11 127 
Whatever exists, therefore, whether it be God or man is of the 
same nature as anything else that exists. More than this. 
They are not only of the same nature. They are also extensions 
of the same body, not even possessing the quality of strict 
individuality. Seneca has to admit this because in answer to 
his own question as to whether matter is continuous, full, and 
all-pervading, or separated and mixed in with Void he says that 
"nihil usque inane est.nl28 "Body" thus spreads continuously 
throughout the universe without rip or gap. The universe, in 
reality, is the sole existing reality, consisting of matter, 
which is divided into divina and humana according to the vary-
ing aspects under which we are viewing the universe. 
We find the same idea contained in yet another passage. 
Seneca holds again that "totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est 
126 Ep. Mor. 117.2 
127 Ep. Mor. 95.52 
128 Quaest. Nat. 3.16.5 
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et deus,· et soc1"i· sumus et me11nbra." 129 It 1"s not s r · · . u pr1s J.Llg 
to find him making the universe one continu::ms body and callirg 
us mere expressions of its multiformity. However, it would be 
difficult to accept the statement that deus is actually the 
material, corporeal universe unless we had the explanation by 
Seneca himself in the passa0e already referred to and in his 
rather general, though, we must aci.mi t, clear confess ion that if 
nvis illum vocare mundum, non falleris.n 130 
0eneca also links the words deus, mundus, and rector 
universi into one picture to sienify their mater:tality. "Nam 
mundus quoque cuncta complec·tens rectorque universi deus in ex-
teriora quidem tendit, sed tamen introrsum undique in se 
redit.nl31 The passage conveys the idea t~at the world, which 
is God, by a series of mutations produced other objects and 
then by a reverse process resolved them again into itself. 
Upon occasion God was also called parens nosterl32 as 
if he were our begetter, protector, and benefactor. To give 
an even more personal touch Seneca gave the author of the uni-
verse the name Pater Liber because he was then to be taken 
specifically as our begetter: nquia omnium parens sit.nl33 
Yet this same term parens is applied to the mundus when Seneca 
129 Ep. Mor. 92.30 
130 Quaest. Nat. 2.45.2 
131 De V. B. 8.4 
132 De Ben. 2.29.4 
133 De Ben. 4.8.1 
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writes: "Unus omnium parens mundus. est." 134 If these quotation 
are taken as Seneca gave them to us, there can be no question 
that deus and mundus are one and the same concept. Different 
names are used merely to point out the various functions of the 
one great world body. God is divested of all personal paternit 
and woven into a nameless mass for which "nomina proprie apta-
bis vim aliquam effecturnque caelestium rerum continentia.nl35 
God's names, therefore, are as endless as the operations of the 
universe. 
Several furth.er investigations, while not as concl1.1sive 
as those already offered, can be construed to signify the ma-
terialistic tone beneath Seneca's words. In urging Lucilius 
to accent w-"latever span of life is assigned to him Seneca would 
have his "mae;nus animus deo pareat et quicquid lex universi 
jubet, sine cunctatione patiatur.nl36 Unless we wish to twist 
Seneca's words into meaning that there are two supreme powers, 
deus and lex universi, we must conclude that the two are again 
just Seneca's way of saying the same thing in slightly altered 
language to suit the situation. The lex universi means, accord 
ing to the context, the order and re1c;u_larity of the universe 
itself, which ordains all creatures to complete their earthly 
span at some destined time. It is the universe, in reality, 
134 De Ben. 3.28.2 
135 De Ben. 4.7.2 
136 Ep. Mor. 71.16 
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ttquodannnodo se habens." vVh.en we obey God, therefore, ·vve are 
also endurlng whatsoever the unlverse is ordering. Again God 
is taken as the universe. 
~.triving to elevate the nature of man Seneca has un-
consciously destroyed the lofty positlon of his deity. In 
many passages Seneca stresses the dignity of man to such an ex-
tent he makes him an equal to God in all save immortall ty •137 
In one outstanding passage we find: "Haec duo(deus, homo) quae 
rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt, quod 
alterum irrm·ortale, alterum mortale est.ul38 And even this 
quality does not affect a man's present security, for "scit non 
multum esse ab homine timendum, a deo nihil.tt 139 It stands to 
reason that, having nothing to fear from God and having the 
same nature, man is not only equal to God, but he is actually 
part of the deity. How this can be possible, since many in-
dividual persons walk the earth, remains for the pantheistic 
philosophers to explain. Seneca does not touch upon this point 
Still, with the words found in tl1is selection, man must at the 
very least be a manifestation of the deity or a membra dei. 
Wnatever pertains, therefore, to the nature of man will auto-
rnatically be predicated of God as well. Likewise, to be lop;i-
cal, we must bestow god-like attributes on man, immortality ex-
137 De Prov. 1.6; De Constant. 8.2; Ep. Mor. 53.11 
138 Ep. Mor. 124.14 
139 De Ben. 7.1.7 
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cepted. 
:More specifically can we evaluate the soul of man from 
this same viewpoint. According to .Seneca 11 Quid aliud voces 
hunc(animum) quam deum in corpore humano hospitantem?nl40 The 
soul is God livLt.e; j_n man. In a later letter beneca asks 
another rhetorical question. ttQuid enim est aliud animus quam 
quodammodo se habens spiritus?nl41 If one would stop here, he 
would interpret s-piritus as an immaterial substance called the 
soul. However, in the very next sentence it is revealed that 
tttanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia, quanto tenu-
ior est.ttl42 The trans:ttion is quite clear. T'::1e s-oiritus is 
matter, if in a somewhat rarified form. Spiritus is also t"l:le 
animus, ~1ich, in turn, is God residing in man. Or to look at 
the same analysis in diagrammatj_c form: Deus - Animus j_n ~ 
ine- Spiritus- Materia(tenuior). In one short set of de-
ductions, therefore, we find man and God alike are purely ma-
terial beine;s. 
After this investigation we are now faced with two set 
of contradictory explanations. At one time greater prominence 
is given to the spiritual, at another to the material side of 
Seneca's conception of God. It vronld seem that selections, 
140 Ep. Mor. 31.11 
141 Ep. Mor. 50.6 
142 Ep.-Mor. 50.6 
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listing God as distinct from matter, and speaking of corporeal 
and incorporeal substances, would form a spiritual basis for 
the Christian attributes predicated of God. For Seneca calls 
God the :Master Builder, and then a lavish benefactor. Man, in 
particular, has received the highest gift possible, his intel-
lect, from God, who then ta1ces up his home in man's soul, mark-
ing the good deeds and correcting those souls that he loves. 
To offset these spiritual and Christian fundaments of God comes 
the astounding revelation that God j_s t:e1e first cause and so is 
purely corporeal since Cause for Seneca is active and so is mrle 
up of matter. Going hand in hand vii th this explanation is the 
belief that God is parens noster when we understru1d that parens 
noster is likewise the world itself. In fact, we too are deus 
and materia because the world is an ~ quid, of w'-,_ich we are 
all members, though broue;ht forth in various forms. .t!'inally, 
God resides in man as his soul. This soul, however, called the 
spiritus hominis, is still nothing more than matter, even :Lf it 
is in a rarified state. 
These are the two pictures placed before us. It would 
be difficult to form any conclusion on the basis of this treat-
ment of deus alone, but, when these explanations are weighed in 
view of Seneca's teachings on Fate, Nature, and Portune, and in 
the light of his whole philosophical background, a definite 
answer is made possible. n1e following chapter will determine 
whether the spiritual or the material is the correct conception 
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of the deity by seeing which is t'ne more compatible with the 
other three terns Seneca used as synomyms for deus, and by 
deciding which is the more consistent with 0eneca 1 s philosophi-
cal background and his other philosophical beliefs. 
r 
CHAPTER V 
DECISION RENDERED 
After the consideration of Seneca's use of deus in the 
preceding chapter one can understand why it is possible to con-
fuse the nature of the divinity. However, because of the in-
vestigation made previously into Seneca's philosophical back-
ground and into the terms used synonymously with ~~ we can 
be certain that we have discovered the meaning Seneca intended 
for God when we say ~ is nothing more than the material uni-
verse itself. Seneca's philosophy, therefore, must be called 
materialistic and pantheistic. In reality, then, Seneca, dif-
fers in no way from the Stoics that preceded him. By giving a 
brief rdsum~ of the basic ethical and metaphysical concepts at 
stake, and by reconsidering the terms Fate, Nature, Fortune, 
and God in their connection with Seneca's philosophical back-
ground, the correctness of this decision will become apparent. 
As the last chapter stated, the basic meaning of the 
word deus cannot be reached by knowing the usage of that soli-
tary word. However, from that word alone one can start the 
analysis into the materiality or spirituality of God's nature. 
For, in spite of the inconsistent wording in applying the term 
deus, Seneca did leave a clue to the ultimate nature of God. 
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If one will only review the analysis of deus, ':le will find that 
when God is performing some action the spiritual side of his 
nature is more in focus. God creates, preserves, assists, cor-
rects, and loves all his creatures. By these activities the 
picture of a personalized and rationalized God is given to us. 
On the other hand, when Seneca uses more basic concepts we have 
stronger arguments for the materiality of God. For only ma-
terial things exist, the world is our Father and is God, and 
the universe is the whole of which everything else is out a 
part. 
Even. if we had not said definitely as yet what God is, 
we could tentatively draw certain conclusions from the foregoing 
paragranh. For the spiritual aspect of God results from the 
operations of God. The quotations t'aemselves show that in this 
activity God j_s considered from an ethical standpoint. However, 
in the field of metaphysics we notice the materiality of God's 
essence. For we remember that only corporeal thinR:s exist and 
that God is the universe which diffuses itself into many dif-
ferent shapes and activities. It is at just this very point 
that the inconsistency of Seneca regarding the deity shows it-
self in boldest outline. His ethical treatment of God contra-
dicts t~1e physical and metaphysical concept of the same deity. 
Since the field of ethics presupposes the study of metaphysics, 
we can presume, on this count, that Seneca held the materiality 
of all things, including God. 
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By reconsidering Fate, Nature, and ~ortune we discover 
that there is nothing which is inconsistent with this material 
view of God's essence, but that there is nothing to favor any 
Christianized interpretation of these words. We ~>.ave seen that 
Fate is called the first cause and the chain of causes that 
flows from it in a series of unchangeable events. Since the 
first cause for Seneca is t-r1e causa efficiens, and, since what-
ever acts is material, this first cause is also material. Na-
ture, again, is taken under a double aspect of materiality. It 
is meant to signify, first of all, t:ne physical universe as a 
life-givi:r1g principle and then as the universe itself in its 
physical makeup. Secondly, Nature stands for an individual 
man's human nature as it exists after j_ ts formation by this 
life-giving principle. Stnce, in this light, man's nature is 
just an efflux or a manifestation of Nature in its broader as-
pect, it too is just as material as the source of its existence 
Besides, the universe can only be corporeal because it is the 
ultimate principle of existence, endowed wl.th activity. As 
such the universe must follow Seneca's premise that "quidquid 
facit, corpus est.nl 
The problem of giving intrinsic meanings to Fortune al-
most defies solution. However, since the references to ~ortune 
occur most freq;_J_ently in passages complaining of the loss of 
material possessions, the most common concept for lt,ortune is 
1 Ep. Mar. 117.2 
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nothing more than the ebb and flow of wealth and worldly goods. 
Whether Seneca meant anything else wr1en speaking of Fortune no 
one apparently has ventured to say. Few will go even as far as 
Arnold does when he says Fortune "has no existence in the abso-
lute sense of.the term. But in practical life, and from the 
limited point of view of the individual concerned, fortune is 
everywhere met with." 2 Moreover, just how this term assists in 
the interpretation of the deity is not at all as certain as the 
other terms applied by Seneca to the Supreme Being. Yet, 
Seneca obviously saw some connection between Fortune and God, 
for, otherwise, how could he make the statement: ttsic nunc na-
turam voca fatum fortunam; omnia ejusdem del nomina sunt varie 
utentis sua potestate"?3 In some sense this quotation mj_ght 
be construed to signify the material universe insofar as the 
things acquired and lost are all material possessions and part 
of the universe. If the universe is another name for God, then 
the increase or loss of one's possessions could more poetically 
be called the favor or onslaught of Fortune. Moreover, this 
argument is in line with the general usage of Fortune, which 
implies harshness, lack of feeling, uneasiness, insecurity, and 
evil. These ideas certainly contradict the ethical concept of 
God proposed by Seneca, for that deity is to be loving, guiding, 
and provident. Nor can he harm anyone since he is all-good.4 
2 Arnold, 209 
3 De Ben. 4 • 8 • 3 
4 Ep. Mor. 75.17 
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These notes of foreboding ascribed by Seneca to Fortune, how-
ewer, would st.J.i t an unthinking and unreeling universe tr1at ~ive 
no care to the individual creatv.res in its domain. It was this 
lack of indivi~.al attention that led Arnold to call Fortune 
"the absence of' both tendency and purpose, which results j_n a 
constant shif'tlns and fro 11 5 of' one's material possessions. 
In anothe-e sense Seneca looks upon Fortune as the un-
predictable force giving, or, more especially,. taking away one's 
worldly possessions. We hear nothing more about this force to 
learn its nature, but since f'or ;::>eneca any name implying f'orce 
indicates God, and since F'ortune is a force, then on this score 
also Portune can be called God. Then we must resort to the 
prime principle of all Seneca's physics that whatever acts, or 
exerts force, is comprised of' matter. This again would show 
Seneca's idea of Fortune was intimately linked with the notion 
of' materiality. 
~ore likely than not Seneca had a conf'used idea of' both 
these views in his mind when he spoke of Fortune. At one time 
the idea of' force was more prevalent; at another the shif't of' 
material things, as affected by f'orce, received greater stress. 
\Vhatever view is adopted, either one is consonant with the ma-
terialistic and pantheistic structure of the universe. In no 
way, however, is it possible to adjust Portune to the spiritual 
5 Arnold, 199 
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istic or the ethical concept of God. 
Although Seneca's doctrines and background reflect the 
teachings of different schools of philosophy, the 0toic doc-
trines on the divinity alone resemble the explanations proffere 
at random by Seneca to assist in teaching some principle of 
life. T>ne Cynics, it was noted earlier, can be used merely as 
a negative norm for Seneca's ideas since for them God was some-
thing unknown and remote from mankind. F'ollowlng the same line 
of reasoning, they also considered all worship a matter of con-
tempt. In contrast to this, however, Jeneca would have people 
cultivate the greatest respect toward God. 
The Epicureans, even though Seneca showed a special 
predilection for certain doctrines they proposed, based their 
notions abm:t God on other concepts which Seneca perforce could 
not follow. The Epicureans' physics postulated atoms and void 
as the ultimates of the universe, whereas Seneca held the un.i-
verse to be one large body with no empty spaces interspersed 
between bodies. 11 Nihil usque inane est. 116 In this way the 
Epicurean gods were merely a fortuitous cluster of atoms pos-
sessed of no power or added dignity. Opposed to this, Seneca 
holds that nothing is separate from the universe. Whatever 
exists is either dtrectly or indirectly part of tnat seamless 
body. Contrary also to the Epicurean physics and metaphysics 
6 Quaest. Nat. 3.16.5 
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which placed many gods far from rnen in the intermundia and 
wnich tried to explain away all necessity of gods, Seneca 
brought his God close to men and attempted to make him a power-
ful force in men's lives. 
It is to tbe Sextian and Stoic doctrines that a marked 
parallel can be seen in Seneca's teachings. In fact, the analy 
sis of Chapter Four resolves itself into the Stoic doctrines 
,,, 
listed in Chapter ~wo. In the earlier chapter Stoicism was 
found to be materialism and pantheism combined into one. Senec~ 
likewise, must fall into t~is category because he too expresses 
the s&>me sentiments and opinions of the early Stoics. 
The Stoics refused to divorce, or even to distine;uish, mind 
and matter, or to exalt the soul by opposinr; it to the body. 
Hence they asserted that nothing exists which is not cornoreal 
or material, though t''ley immediately qualified this statement 
by maintaining that there is nothing corporeal ~1ich is passive 
or inert and that all activity imnlies a LOGOS or spiritual 
principle. The a:Jsolute antagonism of a purely active form and 
a purely passive, which is t·ne crux of the Aristotelian philo-
sophy, is thus set aside; and in its place we have the relative 
opposition of two elements, both of which a?.>e regarded as 
hav:lng ultimately the same nature and origln and both of wh:lch 
are viewed as in one aspect, material and in another spiritua~ 
This is a compendium of the early Stoics and is also a 
condensed edition of t'-le doctrines of 0eneca. For both Zeno 
and Seneca admit that t 1J.e only reality is corporeality, which 
is everything that acts or is acted upon since this is the 
primary note of reality. And this corporeality or matter is 
also possessed of ratio to explain the order in the universe. 
7 C aird, 86 
103 
Neither the early Stoics nor Seneca saw, or cared to see, the 
patent contradiction between ratio, a spiritual faculty, and 
matter as the sole existing reality. That is why Seneca can in 
an emotional moment call God a "sacer intra nos spiritus"8 and 
later in calm reasoning write "unus omnium narens mundus est.'' 9 
"This fact that the primitive matter is characterized by reason 
and activity deprives the Stoic materialism of what would other-
wise be a baneful influence, and explains how the Stoic ethics 
and also the Stoical theology should be so highly spirit·ualistic 
as they unquestionably are.ttlO Yet, this principle does not 
free Stoicism and Seneca from an identical contradictory note 
in their teaching, although it does establish the existence of 
a closely knit alliance between the author and the school. 
Finally, it has been pointed out that both the Stoics 
and Seneca hold the ultimate identity of God with the world, 
and say that any name denoting God is merely another aspect of 
the power-laden matter which comprises the universe. For, Se-
neca and before him "Zeno taught that God is Body, but it was 
not a dead stuff which constituted the world. The thing which 
Zeno was concerned above others to affirm was that this stuff was 
actually Reason. The universe is a living being.nll These two 
notes point out at once the dynamistic materiality of the deity. 
8 Ep. Mor~ 41.2 
9 De Ben. 3.28.2 
10 Davidson, 93 
11 Bevan, 42 
104 
Thus upon a closer analysis the conflict between the 
materialistic and idealistic conception of God disappears. Go~ 
according to Seneca, is only real when he has a material form. 
Therefore, even when he is called animus or ratio, these names 
do not exclude but rati.ler uresuppose that these concepts have 
bodies. Seneca, in other words, is only following the tenets 
of Stoicism 'llfhen he pronounces it indifferent whether God is 
regarded as fatum or divinus spiritus.12 Nor is it a surprise 
after this to understand that ::::eneca is called a Stoic. For, 
although he uses Pythagoras and Ep:i.curus as authorities to pres 
home single truths, yet he boasts in over twenty passap;es that 
he himself should be labelled a Stoic •13 l''rom this evidence it 
could be presumed quite logically that Seneca, who prized the 
na._rne of Stoic to that extent, would be a disciple of t"1is 
school in such a basic matter as the ultimate nature of the 
universe and of God. 
In following this Stoic school Seneca has made it clear 
that ultimately there is no difference between God and primary 
matter; both are one and the same substance. )Vhen regarded as 
the universal substratum, it is known as just matter, but when 
considered as acting force, is calle~ spiritus, natura, animus, 
ratio, fa tum, and deus. Nor are :matter and force distinct 
essences. Actually force is inherent in matter. The force is 
12 Ad Helv. 8.3 
13 Confer the appendix for an elaboration of tills point 
I I 
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something material, is identical with matter. Thus, the dif-
ference mentioned in Chapter Four between efficient cause and 
material cause(God and matter) is no more than the difference 
between spiritus and its elements, which is no difference at 
all. For, both Stoics and s.eneca maintain that every particular 
element has in process of time developed from primary fire, or 
God, and to God it will return at the end of every period of 
the world. It is in this sense that Seneca ascribes the name 
of Hercules to God "quia vis ejus invicta sit quandoque lassata 
fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura.ttl4 But, taking the 
deity in its full meaning, we have primary matter, as well as 
primary force. The sum total of all that is real is the divine 
Breath, moving forth from itself and returning to itself again. 
ttDeus in exteriora quidem tendit, sed tamen introrsum undique 
in se reoit. 11 15 Therefore, the deity itsel.t' is the primary 
fire, the primal substance changing into various individual 
eler11ents, and then back into itself. 'vVhen viewed in itself, 
the primary material force is the whole of the deity. However, 
the things into which this primary substance has changed are 
only indirectly divine and possessed of deity. Still, in a very 
true sense any part of the world may have divinity predicated 
of it. What is not immediately divine is a manifestation of 
the original matter. Then, when everything reverts to the di-
vine material unity, there is no longer any distinction between 
what was originally divine and what was a part or a manifes-
14 De ~en. 4.8.1 
15 De v. B. 8.4 
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tation of the divinity. 
As a summation of the foregoing we quote Zeller in his 
Stoics, Enicureans, and Sceptics. 
The Stoics admitted no essential difference between God and the 
world. Their system was therefore strictly Pantheistic. The 
world is the sum of all real existence, and all real existence 
is originally contained in deity, which is at once the matter 
of everything and the creative force which moulds this matter 
into particular individual substances. ,Je can, therefore, 
think of nothine; w~1ich is not either immediately deity or a 
manifestation of deity. In point of essence, therefore, God 
and the world are the same; indeed, the two conceptions are de-
clared by the Stoics to be absolutely identical. If they have 
nevertheless to be distinguished, the distinction is only de-
rivative and partial. The same universal Being is called God 
when it is re,::;arded as a whole, World when i. t is regarded as 
progressive in the many forms assumed in the course of its de-
velopment. The difference, therefore, is tantamount to assisn-
ing a difference of meaning to the term world, according as it 
is used to express the whole of what exists, or only the de-
rivative part.l6 
Although the word ttstoics" is employed throughout this quo-
tation, Seneca's name can be supplied without any violation of 
meaning since his position in this case is exactly that of the 
Stoic school of thou€'-Jlt. The analysis conducted in Chapter 
Four has shown that :::ieneca's words admit this Stoic interpre-
tation without any difficulty. 
In view of the many arguments offered we can classify 
under four headings the evi.dence which leads one to accept 
wi.thout reserve the pantheisti.c nature of Seneca's universe and 
the universal materialism of his Supreme Belng. 
(1) It is true that the ethical concept of God can be 
16 Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, 156-8 
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given a spiritual interpretation; however, rtyou cannot have 
ethical doctrine without a basis of Dhysical and metaphysical 
doctrine. You can have no rule of conduct wi tholJ.t some view of 
the universe wherein the action is to take place.n17 Thus, God 
used as a :motivation for a good moral life and considered in 
his relations to men resembles the God the Christians adored. 
Yet, :more basically in the examination of the physical universe 
Seneca states his belief in the existence of matter alone. 
Nothing, not even God, is excluded from this postulate. 
(2) l''ate, Nature, and Fortune, the synomyms for God, 
can all be construed as parts or aspects or special phases of 
t·'le material universe, but cannot make sense if t::1ey are to be 
endowed wlth a spiritual meaning. 
(3) Althouc;h Seneca's philosophical bacl<:ground was 
varied, there is a distinct resemblance between ~is words on 
the deity and those spoken by ·the members of the Stoic school. 
And, since the Stoics ar>e commonly known to be materiallsts 
and pantheists, thoup-,h in ~eneca's time the pantheism of the 
Stoics did adopt a more personalized concept of the universe 
and spoke of God as Creator, Father, and Guardian, so ~eneca's 
words can be given a no more elevated meaning than the pan-
theism they copy. 
(4) The appendix lists more than twenty references to 
Seneca's profession of Stoicism. From this admission we might 
17 Bevan, 31 
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presume that on such a large j_ssue as the meaning of God he 
would agree wit~ the school with ~hich he indicates he is af-
filiated. Of course, this argument taken by itself could prove 
nothing, but it helps to strengthen the conclusions already 
reached in the first three arguments. 
Since all the evidence proposed indicates t"nat Seneca 
called himself a Stoic, that his teachings have a materialistic 
core, and that his words in all essentials run parallel with 
the Stoic concept of God, we can, therefore, classify Seneca 
as a true Stoic and discredit any spiritual interpretation of 
his words. No matter how Christian his words may sound upon 
occasion, they still retain the ultimate materj_alism and pan-
theism of the Stoic philosophers. For the basic explanation 
of the world for Seneca never transcends sheer materiality. 
Beautiful and stirring though they may be, the words of Seneca 
in the last analysis mean no more than the more direct argu-
ments given 6eno to his followers centuries before. Seneca 
may have the enthusiasm of St. Paul and he may parallel the 
words of Scripture, but he still remains Seneca the materialist 
and pantheist.. And his deity will never be anything more than 
the wide sweep of the material universe. Even though classical 
students of every century cease not to wonder how such elevated 
language could flow from a mind steeped in Stoicism and are 
drawn to find the solution to apparent contradictions and in-
consistency, the answer will always be found to be the same. 
God is the Universe and the Universe is God. 
r 
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APPENDIX 
SECTION A 
FATE 
DE PROVIDENTIA 
5.6 Fate is the set law of t~lings. 
5.8 We are swept along by Fate 
5.8 Fate is inexorable; even God is ruled by Fate. 
21.6 
11.1 
1.4 
4.1 
11.1 
11.3 
15.3 
4.7.2 
19.6 
63.14 
76.23 
77.12 
93.1 
91.15 
101.7 
107.12 
AD MARCIAtvr DE C01\ISOLATIONE 
The I<,ates go theirway and do not add or subtract 
from t~1e promised span of life. 
DE BREVITAr.rE VITAE 
Old men thL~:.k that t~1ey deceive Fate just as they 
dece~_ve themselves when they believe they have more 
years yet to live. 
AD POLYBIUM DE CONSOLATIOi\fE 
.All menhave an end-.- Tlns universality dulls the 
cruelty of Fate. 
We cannot change Fate. 
It is not due to an unjust Fate that we die. We were 
only permitted to live in the first place. 
The ~ates take all in death sooner or later. 
AD hELVIAM DE CONSOLATIONE 
Fate contrived tha~Helvia would not be with Seneca 
in exile. 
DE BENEPICIIS 
Pate is a connected chain of causes. 
EPISTULAE N10RALES 
Fate is woven from a succession of causes. 
Fate cares nothing for age. It just takes men off. 
A good man patiently accepts Fate. 
Fate arranged the span of life. Do not pray for 
more days. 
We rail at Fate for cutting off a man's life, but it 
is better for us to obey Nature. 
Be reconciled to B'ate by which all things are ruled 
and dissolved. 
Our death is set by remorseless Pate. 
The great souled man is one who gives himself over 
to Pate. 
5.8 
6.8 
19.3 
1.5.3 
1.17.2 
2.11.4 
2.20.2 
1.19.1 
1.6 
7.1 
16.1 
20.1 
22.3 
8.1 
15.5 
5.1 
5.3 
7.2 
10.2 
11.7 
15.6 
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SECTION B 
NATURE 
DE PROVIDEN'l1IA 
Let Nature deal with matter as she pleases. 
It is· easy to renounce Nature. Commit suicide. 
DE CONSrrMTTIA 
Keep the post-rn life that Nature assigned you. 
DE IRA 
He has the least knowledge of Nature who ascribes the 
vice of anger to men. 
Nature has given us sufficient equipment in reason to 
control our lives. 
Nature ordains that that which is great by the fear 
it instils in others also fears something else. 
It is hard to change Nature since the e'ements com-
bine in us at ')irth. 
DE C LEiviENT IA 
Power is not harmful if it is according to Nature's 
law. For Nature had set up kingship in the case of 
the bees and other creatures. 
AD Iv~ARCIAIVl DE CONSOLATI0l'TE 
Time is Nature's healer of sorrows. 
:Nature bids us grieve for our dear ones. 
Nature has not dealt grudgingly with woman's nature. 
Death is a great discovery of Nature. 
Nature treats those most kindly whom she early re-
moves from life. 
DE VITA BEATA 
We must use Nature as ~guide. Reason heeds her. 
Every hardsnip comes by a law of Nature. 
DE OTIO 
Nature begot us for--contemplation and action. 
Nature begot us to be spectators of her beauty. 
DE TRANQUILLITA'l1E ANINii 
Work is in vain where Nature objects. 
Nature made ~abit an alleviation for disasters. 
Nature hemmed us in with sickness, disaster, but this 
is not unexpected. 
In misfortune have the measure of sorrow that Nature 
(and not custom) prescribes. 
r 
' 
- 1.1 
12.4 
1.1 
1.4 
4.3 
10.4-6 
1 11.1 15.3 
-~ 
~ 
., 
5.1 
6.8 
10.11 
1.1.11 
2.29.3 
4.12.5 
6.23.6 
16.8 
22.15 
30.11 
41.8 
~ 45.9 
! ,, 
' i 55.1 66.1 
I 66.39 
t 78.7 
90.16 
90.44 
93.2 
93.8 
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DE BnEVITATE VITAE 
Some say Nature is spiteful in giving a short span 
of life. 
They wastetime and twist Nature who sing or hum their 
worthless tunes. 
AD POLYBIUM DE CONSOLA'l'IONE 
Nature brings all things by her laws to destruction. 
Death or the end comes to all by the law of Nature. 
This universality dulls the cruelty of this Fate. 
Nature has decreed a life of sorrow; man's first act 
at birth is to cry. 
Nature gives loans, not possessi.ons(for all must die) 
No one is exempt from Nature's law of death. 
Nature destined Augustus for heaven, out not even he 
escaped sorrow. 
AD HELVIAIVI DE CO]SOLA'l'IONE 
Nature intended that we need little for happiness. 
'I'he law of Nature governs raovement of the planets. 
Nothing satisfies greed; very little satisfies Natur~ 
DE BENEFICIIS 
Nature begetsprogeny. 
Nature does not suffer certain qualities in same 
person; so people complaln. 
The heavens fulfill their office in the fixed order 
of Nature. 
Nature created man and gave him great privileges. 
EPISTULAE ~:WHALES 
Nature's wants are slight; so follow Nature. 
It is not Nature's fault that we are worse when we 
die than when we were born. 
Nature wishes her laws to be ours. 
Man's highest good is achieved by living to his own 
Nature(rational). 
He is happy who conforms himself to the laws of 
Nature. 
Nature gave us Ollr legs and eyes. 
Nature acted unfairly in giving Claranus such a poor 
body for such a gifted soul. 
Heason is copying Nature. 
Nature constructed us so that pain is endurable or is 
short. 
Nature equ'Lpped us for vi'r1.'atever she enforced on us. 
Nature does not give virtue; it is an art to be go.od. 
It is fairer for us to obey Nature than it is when 
the Fates take off a young man in death. 
We are Nature's creditors for having lived. 
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93.9 
94.56 
98.14 
104.22 
107.8 
110.10 
116.3 
117.23 
117.32 
119.'3 
120.4 
122.5 
122.19 
6.6 
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EPISTULAE TvtORALES 
We k2:1ow Natnrels beginrnngs: how she orders the course 
of the heavens, changes, and brings to an end. She 
is the end of her own existence. 
Nature nroduced us in health and freedom; she elevate 
our gaze to the skies, not to objects of greed. 
VI/hen one strays from Nature, he is a slave to chance. 
Nature has given ·us a brave spi_rit to combat all 
things. 
Nature moderates the world by changi.ng the seasons 
and the weather. 
We bring forth gOld and silver out of the earth con-
trary to Nature and thus get the material for our 
destruct-ton. 
1~ature gave us an interest in our well-being. 
Select any part of Nature as a means of death. These 
means are to be found in the elements. 
Nature has not p;iven us so much tlme that we can 
waste it. 
Nature wants only her due, nothing more; bread can 
be coarse or fine, etc. 
Nature gives us not knowledge, but seeds of knowledge 
All vices are a rebellion against Nature. 
If we follow Nature, all is easy; if not, we row 
ap;ainst the current. ·1 
SECTION C 
FORTUNE 
DE PHOVIDENTIA 
Scorn PortuneTit cannot harm you. 
DE C Oi.!STAN'l'IA 
5.4 Fortune taJcesonly what she !1as given. 
5. 7 Property, etc. are t:dngs at J:!'ortune' s call. 
8.3 F'ortune always outmatched by virtue. 
8.3 Man can bear injuries of men, if he can bear those 
of Fortune. 
15.3 
15.5 
3.6.5 
3.25.4 
Fortune conquers us, unless we conquer her. 
Fortune has no place in a poor(wise) man's house. 
DE IRA 
Fortune is not so-submissive to anyone t~at she al-
ways responds. 
Fortune cannot harm him who is serene in mind. 
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DE C LEMEHT IA 
Fortune proclaims giftts for human beings. 
The w:tse man will parry Fortune's strokes. 
AD MARC IAM DE C ONSDLATIOi'~E 
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We cannot acquit Portune of Marcia's complaint of 
taking away her possessions(children). 
An unruffled splrit corrquers Fortune. 
Take what .B'ortune gives remembering it is insecure. 
l'1 ortune outrages· the Caesars at times, showing they 
have less control over themselves than over others. 
Fortune is merciful to Il/larcia even when it is angry. 
Fortune sometimes apportions goods unjustly, but 
death levels all things. 
!v1en are a small part of Portune 1 s domain. 
DE VITA BEA'J'A 
Indifference ·to Fortune is the escape to fre•3dom. 
'Nhoever follows virtue and pleasure begins to depend 
on Fortune. 
Seneca heeds not Fortune since he despises riches 
alike when he has them and vvhen he lacks them. 
Seneca desplses the whole domain of Fortune. 
DE OTIO 
F'ortune wrecks naught of what Nature has appo5_nted. 
DE TRANQ! IJ.LI'l1ATE ANIMI 
Let not man act as if there is no place w:1ere man 
can escape from Portune. 
Portune might remove one from high position. 
Those wlwm Fortune never regarded are more cheerful 
than those she has forsaken. 
Reduce your possessions so as to be less exposed to 
the injuries of J:'ortune. 
Seek riches within yourself, not from Fortune. 
All are chained to Fortune. 
Llmit your advancement in material riches before 
Fortune can decide the end of this advancement. 
The wise man never retreats from Fortune because he 
has nothing to lose. 
A man of many affairs puts himself in Fortune 1 s power. 
DE BREVITATE VITAE 
Nothing is above him who lS above Portune. 
By de1)end:tng on the morrow and wastinr:r today· one 
attempts to dispose of what Fortune governs and not 
what he himself governs. 
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AD POLYBIUM D:2 CONSOLATIONE 
Fortune-rs fickle and shifts its favors. 
Fortune afflicts all with death. 
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Nothine; is sacred to Fortune. She touches all with 
the hand of death. 
Fortune provides many e;ood things. 
AD Hb""LVIAlY1 Dn CONSOLATI01'E 
Seneca never trusted Fortune even when it offered 
peace: blessinr:rs, ~noney, influence. 
No one is crushed by Portune who is not first de-
ceived by her smiles. 
Philosophy alone can save :;::elvia from the onslaught 
of }'ortune. 
DE BENEFIC IIS 
F'ortune r0.ay e;ive ym cities, but do not be proud. 
Fortune is very rarely judicious. 
:F'ortune can buy and sell the body, but not man's m1nd. 
Fortune modifies t~e issue of even the best plans. 
Fortune places kings in t-neir hlgh posi tioLs. 
EPISTULAE MORALE;:, 
No man is so far advanced by Fortune that he is not 
threatened as greatly as he has been aided. 
It is noble to be contented and not deoendent on 
Fortune. 
When :Fortune is kind, we must fortify ourselves 
against her violence. 
f:;ecuri ty does not depend on Fortune. 
Fortune has no jurisdiction over character. 
Portune alone often keeps cruel and ambitious ':1en 
from- attemntins the very worst deeds. 
S:he. soul alor1e render us noble and rises above 
Fortune. 
V,'hat l''ortune has not given (peace of mind), she can 
not take away. 
Fortune takes away friends, but she also gives them. 
!J.'he wise man overcomes Fortune by his virtues. 
l<1 ortune gives us nothing we can own. 
Anyone who deems t"'1ings other t~1an virtue to be good 
puts ~1.imself in the :90!~er of Portune. . 
There is no wall that 1' ortune can:aot ta1.::e 'Jy storm;' 
so st.rene;then the inner defences of the soul. 
He is the richest to whom }'ortune gave not-,li.ng. 
Portune cannot hurt one protected by philosophy • .She 
can only seize one who clings to her. 
T:'l.e brave man(wise man) fears not death, burning, im-
prisonment, and other missiles of F'ortune. He just 
takes them as nart of existence. 
.. . 
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EPISTULAE LORALES 
Fortune generally allovvs men when assailing t 11.em col-
lectively to have a forebod~_ng of t~1.e suffering to 
come. 
1,'J1lat is there that Fortune does not drag down from 
prosperity, the more violently the more brilliant j_ t 
happens to be. 
Perfect reason alone can stand firm against Portune. 
Fortune gives us neit~er good nor evil, but only the 
raw material for these. 
Fortune lets man go(to deatcl) 'iiVhen she sees fit. 
The only safe harbor is a readiness to receive Per-
tune's missiles, neither skulking nor turning bacl{. 
Are we under guardianship of t··1e ?,ods or consigned 
to .Portune? 
SECTION D 
GOD 
DE PROVIDENTIA 
A tie of likeness exists between God and man. The 
only difference ls one of time. \';ian is god's off-
spring; God tests a good man. 
God favors those w'wm he gives a chance to do the 
courageous and the brave deeds. 
God disciplines those whom he loves. 
v~11.atever ordains us to live and die also bin.ds the 
gods. Creator of the world made Fate, yet he follows 
its decrees. 
IVlan outstrips God in that he is superior to evil. 
God is just exempt from it. 
DE C O:::JSTANTIA 
The wise man IS llle tne gods in all save irrnnortali ty. 
DE CLB]v;ENTIA 
If the immortalgods require a reclconing from me, I 
am ready. 
Nero is to be ju.st ·and merciful as t'1e gods are. 
DE IHA . 
Man alone comprehends J-od and imitates him. 
The divlne Dlan operates in the laws of Nature. The 
immortal gods neither wish to nor are able to hurt us 
You waste time in praying God for something. 
AD MARC IAM DE C ONSOLi\TIOHE 
Even divinities can-perish in death. So stories tell 
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AD IvlARC IA~2: DE CONSOLATIONE 
Fortuneca.._rmot holdviThat Nature has let go. 
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The soul appears to be immortal. So God is immortal. 
God destroys the earth in cycles. 
AD POLY'Bimii DE C ONSOLA'l'IONE 
Former great men are enrolled as gods. Let us imi tat 
them in adversity. 
AD HEINIAlV1 DE C OJ~SOLATIOhE 
6.8 The planets whirl about by the inviolable law of 
Nature. God's nature finds delight in speedy motion. 
8.3 Vvbat j_s the great creator? God? Reason, Spirit, or 
Pate? 
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DE OTIO 
Did God create many systems? v'v'l"lat is the nature of 
God? Does he encompass his works wit.lin or without? 
DE 5REVITA1'E VITAE 
It is more important to know 'i'f'::lat shape and substance 
Jod has and what Natv.re has in store for the soul 
freed from the body than to be concerned with worldly 
things. 
DS Vri'A BEATA 
God is called-rhe-wDrld. 
You assume likeness to God in beinr.; virtuous. 
The gods are the rulers of tne world. They are the 
censors of deeds and words. 
DE BENEPICIIS 
The immortal gods are beneficent even to evil men. 
We are below the gods. People say the gods neglect 
us when Nature does not let certain qualities exist 
in the same person. 
Our Father has bestowed benefits and blessings on us. 
We receive our existence from the gods. 
The gods give judgment. 
F'ear the gods who witness all ingratitude. 
'lne world is the parent of us all. 
If giving is only to seek for a return, then the eods 
would not give anything. 
The gods do hear our prayers and are generous. 
God has been extravagant in forming the universe for 
us. 
God and nature and divine reason are the same. God 
is the first of a chain of cat;.ses. Any na.'."'le can 
stand for God if it connotes force. 
Nature, Fate, J:i'ortune, and God are the same. All 
powers will return into primal fire. 
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DE Br.N ID' IC I IS 
God gives manreason and fellowship with himself. 
The stars are called gods. 
Good is done to us by the gods without their seeking 
for any advantage. 
Certain gifts God bestows on all human beings. 
Gods show indulgence to some because of their ancestry. 
God thought me worthy of this set of benefits. 
We ask for·help from the gods by prayers; but they do 
not hear us. 
The gods act under no external constraint. They are 
heavenly bodies. 
Our interests are the concern of the gods. Nature 
created us. Tnere was design in the creation of man. 
Men alone have intellects. 
1fhe irmnortal gods rule without arms from on high. 
God suffers no harm because of his divine nature. 
'rhat person has perfect knowledge of the useful and 
essential who knovvs he has nothing to fear from God 
or :':lan., 
EPISTULAE lv:OMLE~ 
Juppiter returns within himself w!wn Nature and the 
heavens are in the process of di_ssolution. 
God bestows the number of days of life. 
We should thank God for freedom to end life. 
If God is the arbiter of t11e universe, obey him; if 
chance, endure it. 
There is true liberty in study ng philosophy. No 
longer will God or man be feared. 
He alone is worthy of God who scorns riches. 
Have a plan of life wah a knowlede;e of things human 
and divine. 'rhis makes one an associate of the gods 
and not their suppliant. 
No one has knowledge of God. 
God is t1e highest and :rrJ.ost powerful. 'l']le soul is a 
god dwelling within us. 
God dwells within us. God is a spirit marki11g our 
good and evil deeds. 
The beauty of nature indicates God's existence. 
All men spring from the gods. 
Study philosophy and you will differ from the gods 
only in t~at they live longer. 
We are weak, so let us turn our minds to what is 
eternal, namely God, who protects and ~overns all. 
The first cause is simple because natter is simple. 
The first cause is creative reason or God. 
Seneca asks r'netorical questions as to whether he 
should inquire into the nature of the 11 artifex mundi .' 
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EPISTULAE JviORALES 
God and matter exist. God controls matter. 
All thin3s are subject to change, althoug.."l God con-
trols them. 
Great souls should comply with God's wishes and suffer 
what the law of t'1e universe ordains. 
A god controls the seasons. 
A wise man is most happy, even as the gods. 
Lust, banquets, etc. do not pertain to God. 
Is anything good in which man surpasses God'l 
Let man be pleased at whatever pleases God. 
Gods are not powers of evil since they are all-good 
and thus cannot harm anyone. 
The good man has the highest sense of duty to t'l.e 
gods. Good men know that all happens by the divine 
law. 
The divine decrees are unalterable. 
A god will be Lucilius' sponsor. This god is a soul 
that loves right and goodness. 
Nothing is hidden from the sight of god. 
That produces a wi.s e rr1an which produces a god, i.e., 
a perfect reason and conformity to Nature. 
Wisdom discloses, what the temple of the gods is; it 
also tells what the gods are. 
Viisdom takes us back to eternal Reason, the beginning 
of all things., and the force inhering in seeds of 
all things. 
The dlvine Reason is in command of all things; our 
reason is the same becal1 Se it is derived from the 
divine reason. 
Human beinr;s are .3econd only to the gods. 
Reason is perfect in the gods. In us it is "perfect-
ible.u 
Man is from God and will return to participate in 
divinity. The universe is God and we are his members 
and associates. 
None deal fairly with the gods. We rail at Fate, ~ut 
is it not fairer that we obey Nature rat[ler than it 
obey us? 
The immortal gods were born with goodness as part of 
their nature. 
~Ian never makes progress until he has the right idea 
of God. Believe God exists, is supreme, and punishes 
We are all parts of one body(includes god and man). 
Nature created us from the same source and for the 
same end. 
Seneca not only obeys God, but agrees with him. 
Do not carp at Nature for what ha-cpens, but accompany 
the god under whose guidance all progresses. 
Are we consigned to guard:tans or left to Fortune? 
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EPI:ST:TLAE Iv,ORA.LES 
God, our :F'ath.er, has given us all t::1ings for our own 
good. 
God the creator gives infinite variety. 
All infer the gods exist because everyone has an idea 
of the deity. 
If you wish to live, pray to the gods for health. If 
you wish to die, ignore the gods and end your life. 
The builder of the-universe provided that we should 
live in well being, bu.t not in luxury. 
A virtuous man has developed his soul's capabilities 
until he is inferior only to God from whom a part 
flows into man. 
There ar>e four natures: tree, animal, man, God. Man 
and God are of the same· nature. God is imrn.ortal, hut 
not so man. 
That is perfect which is accordinp; to nature as a 
whole. Nature has reason. 
!'.-Ian is on a level with God when he possesses perfect 
reason. 
SECTION E 
SENECA CALLS HIMSELF A sroiC 
De Otio 1.4 
De Otio 2.1 
De Otio 6.4 
De Otio 8.1 
De Ira 2.19.3 
De Beneficiis 2.31.1 
De Beneficiis 2.35.2 
De Beneficiis 4.2.1 
De Beneficiis 4.8.1 
De Beneficiis 5.12.5 
Epistulae Morales 13.4 
Epistulae Morales 33.3-4 
Epistulae Morales 59.1 
Epistulae Morales 65.2 
Epistulae Morales 68.2 
Epistulae Morales 71.6 
Epistulae Morales 74.23 
Epistulae Morales 82.19 
Epistulae Morales 87.26 
Epistulae Morales 89.8 
Epistulae Morales 99.26-27 
Epistulae Morales 116.1 
Epistulae Morales 117.2 
Epistulae Morales 124.2 
r 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Robert J. Koehn, S.J., has 
been read and approved by three members of the Department 
of Classical Langugages. 
The final copies have been examined by the director 
of the thesis and the signature which appears below 
verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been 
incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final 
approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical 
accuracy. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts. 
/tf:::fr- IS, Jfif:7 
e I 7 
